TORT AS META-REGULATION: THE LIABILITY OF
PRIVATE TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORS
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ABSTRACT
Consumers in developed countries regularly voice concerns
regarding the working conditions under which goods, especially
clothing and electronics, are manufactured in developing countries.
Nobody wants slavery sneakers or a sweatshop iPhone; we all want
to purchase fair trade goods. But how do we know we can trust a
fair-trade label? Such certificates are given by private transnational
organizations, which fill a regulatory vacuum created by the
persisting weakness of international organizations such as the
International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World Health
Organization (WHO). Absent any global oversight framework that
supervises the work of such private regulators, it is unclear whether
these certificates can be trusted, or whether they represent a mere
whitewashing/greenwashing strategy, which allows multinational
enterprises to turn a blind eye to manufacturing conditions across
the less visible tiers of their global supply chains. To increase the
accountability of this system, we propose holding private
transnational regulators liable in tort if their actions (or omissions)
generated harms. We support this proposal through a comparative
legal analysis and discuss the practicalities of its implementation.
We argue that this proposal will support and facilitate positive
network effects in the global private regulation system.

* Assistant Professor, Bar-Ilan University Law School.
** Professor of Law, Dean, Bar-Ilan University Law School.

667

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

668

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 43:3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

III.
IV.

V.

Introduction ....................................................................... 669
The Failure of Traditional Legal Frameworks .............. 677
a. The Limits of Traditional Public Law Solutions............. 678
i.
National Regulation ......................................... 678
ii.
International Public Law Regulation ............... 680
b. Traditional Private Law Mechanisms ............................ 685
i.
Traditional Tort Claims.................................... 687
ii.
Suing Down the Supply Chain ........................ 689
Private-Public Hybrids: The Limitations of Private
Regulators .......................................................................... 700
A Proposal: Tort Liability of Private Regulators ......... 705
a. Liability Regimes ............................................................ 706
b. Liability of Standard-Setters in U.S. and Canadian Case
Law .............................................................................. 711
c. Network Implications and Policy Considerations .......... 713
d. Jurisdiction ..................................................................... 717
Conclusion ......................................................................... 718

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss3/2

2022]

Tort as Meta-Regulation
I.

669

INTRODUCTION

On March 25, 1911, a fire broke out in the Triangle Shirtwaist
Factory in the Greenwich Village neighborhood of Manhattan, New
York City. 1 The flames quickly consumed the 8th, 9th, and 10th
floors of the building. 2 While most workers on the 8th and 10th
floors managed to escape unharmed,3 the main exit door on the 9th
floor was locked.4 This was standard practice at the time, meant to
reduce theft and to prevent workers from taking unauthorized
breaks.5 Trapped behind the locked door, workers on the 9th floor
burned alive, suffocated from inhaling the smoke, or were forced to
jump to their certain death on the sidewalks below.6 146 died, most
of them young women.7 The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire is one
of the deadliest industrial disasters in U.S. history 8 and brought
about profound legal and societal transformations.9 The fire led to
legislation requiring improved factory safety standards; 10 more
broadly, it is considered the starting point for industry and
1
For the details of the 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist fire, see generally LEON STEIN,
THE TRIANGLE FIRE (2011); SABRINA CREWE & ADAM R. SCHAEFER, THE TRIANGLE
SHIRTWAIST FACTORY FIRE (2004).
2
Arthur F. McEvoy, The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911: Social Change,
Industrial Accidents, and the Evolution of Common-Sense Causality, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
621, 628 (1995).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See id. (noting how the doors in the Triangle Shirtwaist factory were
allegedly locked to prevent theft).
6
Patricia Lanier Pence, Paula Phillips Carson, Kerry D. Carson, J. Brooke
Hamilton III & Betty Birkenmeier, And All Who Jumped Died: The Triangle Shirtwaist
Factory Fire, 41 MGMT. DECISION 407, 409 (2003).
Bodies were falling all around us . . . . The girls just leaped wildly out of
the windows and turned over and over before reaching the sidewalk . . . .
They stood on the windowsills tearing their hair out in the handfuls and
then they jumped. One girl held back after all the rest and clung to the
window casing until the flames from the window below crept up to her
and set her clothing on fire. Then she jumped far over the net and was
killed instantly, like all the rest.
Stories of Survivors. And Witnesses and Rescuers Outside Tell What They Saw, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 4 (quoting Benjamin Levy, an eyewitness to the Triangle
Shirtwaist factory Fire).
7
McEvoy, supra note 2, at 622.
8
See generally McEvoy, supra note 2, at 621 (referencing the Triangle Shirtwaist
Factory fire as “one of the most infamous industrial accidents in U.S. history”).
9
See McEvoy, supra note 2, at 621-22.
10
See McEvoy, supra note 2, at 622, 626, 641.
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workplace safety law 11 and an important landmark in the move
towards the modern regulatory state. 12 In the century since the
Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire, developed countries introduced
unprecedentedly detailed and ambitious legal frameworks designed
to regulate industry and market behavior in order to reduce harms
generated through the operation of modern industrialized society. 13
The goal of such legal reforms was to make sure that tragedies such
as the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire do not repeat themselves.14
Yet in some ways, little has changed since this disaster took
place. On September 11, 2012, a full century after the Triangle
Shirtwaist Factory fire, a similar factory fire claimed the lives of at
least 262 workers, many of them found themselves trapped behind
locked doors. 15 Some were only able to escape by using heavy
machinery to break out through the thick windows.16 Less fortunate
workers died of burns or from inhaling the smoke,17 while others
were boiled alive in the factory basement in the water used to
extinguish the fire.18 This factory fire did not occur in New York
City, but at the Ali Enterprises factory in Karachi, Pakistan. Claims
against the factory focus on the existence of heavy iron bars on the
windows, 19 the lack of emergency exits, 20 the fact that the few
11
Marcia L. McCormick, Consensus, Dissensus, and Enforcement: Legal
Protection of Working Women from the Time of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire to
Today, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 645, 646-47 (2011).
12
DAVID VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA 10-15
(2003).
13
See BRENDA LANGE, THE TRIANGLE SHIRTWAIST FACTORY FIRE 75-86 (2008)
(discussing the legislative efforts to improve work conditions after the fire);
ELIZABETH FAULKNER BAKER, PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION: WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO WOMEN IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 153-56 (1925); McEvoy, supra note
2, at 621 (arguing the fire was the trigger for legislative reform); Eric G. Behrens,
The Triangle Shirtwaist Company Fire of 1911: A Lesson in Legislative Manipulation, 62
TEX. L. REV. 361, 365-67 (1983) (discussing successes in legislative reform after the
fire).
14
See McCormick, supra note 11, at 646 (“The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory
tragedy mobilized the labor movement and progressive reformers, and provided
part of the political will to enact significant protective health and safety legislation
for workers.”).
15
Carolijn Terwindt, Sheldon Leader, Anil Yilmaz-Vastardis & Jane Wright,
Supply Chain Liability: Pushing the Boundaries of the Common Law?, 8 J. EUR. TORT L.
261, 272 (2017).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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available exits were locked, and generally highlight the lack of
adequate fire safety measures.21
Together, these two factory fires tell the story of a legal failure of
epic proportions. Despite a century of regulatory efforts, 22
industrial accidents are a growing concern, with numerous
casualties yearly. To take another example, in 2013, the Rana Plaza
factory collapse left 1,129 Bangladeshi workers dead and 2,515
injured.23 The reason for this continuous failure is that factories like
the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory mostly did not stay in New York City
but were replaced by production sites in developing countries such
as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.
Thus, as part of the
globalization of the world economy, production, and its associated
labor and environmental risks largely shifted from developed to
developing countries. 24 At the same time, the stricter regulatory
frameworks adopted in western countries are not applicable beyond
their borders. Developing countries in Asia, Africa, and South
America still lag behind in their regulatory infrastructure and did
not fully adopt the comprehensive regulatory regimes developed in
western countries.25 This is not only a safety concern; production in
Id.
See LANGE, supra note 13, at 75, 87; BAKER, supra note 13, at 153-56; Behrens,
supra note 13, at 365-67; McEvoy, supra note 2, at 621.
23
Philip James, Lilian Miles, Richard Croucher & Mark Houssart, Regulating
Factory Safety in the Bangladeshi Garment Industry, 13 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 431, 431
(2019).
24
See Andrew B. Bernard, Teresa C. Fort, Valerie Smeets & Frederic
Warzynski, Heterogeneous Globalization: Offshoring and Reorganization 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26854, 2020) (noticing a rise of low-wage
imports in developing countries); GARY GEREFFI & OLGA MEMEDOVIC, UNITED
NATIONS INDUS. DEV. ORG., THE GLOBAL APPAREL VALUE CHAIN: WHAT PROSPECTS
FOR UPGRADING BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 3 (2003) (explaining why apparel
industry moved its manufacturing to developing countries); Ashok Kumar, A Race
from the Bottom? Lessons from a Workers’ Struggle at a Bangalore Warehouse, 23
COMPETITION & CHANGE 346, 347 (2019) (“Manufacturing sectors . . . relocated
production from Global North to the Global South early in the process of
globalization.”).
25
See Allen Blackman, Zhengyan Li & Antung A. Liu, Efficacy of Commandand-Control and Market-Based Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries, 10
ANN. REV. RES. ECON. 381, 381-82 (2018) (discussing shortfalls of the regulatory
efforts in developing countries); Jinhua Zhao, Environmental Regulation: Lessons for
Developing Economies in Asia 8-12 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 890,
2019) (analyzing challenges that developing countries face in implementing
successful environmental regulations); Jennifer Besserman & Ray A. Mentzer,
Review of Global Process Safety Regulations: United States, European Union, United
Kingdom, China, India, 50 J. LOSS PREVENTION PROCESS INDUS. 165, 180 (2017)
21
22
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developing countries relies on millions of forced laborers, denied
pay and elementary living conditions.26 Environmental disasters are
also a major issue; in what is now known as the “Bhopal Gas
Tragedy,”27 more than forty tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked
from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, immediately killing more
than 3,800 people, with thousands more victims in the following
months. 28 Such disasters demonstrate the need for improving
regulatory standards in developing countries.29
We focus on this issue as a failure of enforcement. The legal
reforms that followed the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire
symbolized a vision: to increase safety, save lives, and improve
working conditions.30
This vision did not come to fruition. Production largely still
takes place under similar conditions to those that led to the Triangle
Shirtwaist Factory fire, or worse; this is evident in the recent and
frequent disasters such as the Ali Enterprises factory fire and the

(reporting higher employment fatality rates for China and India in comparison to
the European Union, United Kingdom and the United States); Vinand M. Nantulya
& Michael R. Reich, The Neglected Epidemic: Road Traffic Injuries in Developing
Countries, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 1139, 1140-41 (2002) (discussing inadequate regulation
and infrastructure to address high road traffic injuries in developing countries);
Zain Anwar, Atif Mustafa & Muhammad Ali, Appraisal of Process Safety Management
Practices in Refining Sector of Pakistan, 128 PROCESS SAFETY & ENV’T PROT. 36, 40 (2019)
(noting absence of safety regulations and system for refining sector in Pakistan).
26
See Marsha Dickson & Hayley Warren, A Look at Labor Issues in the
Manufacturing of Fashion Through the Perspective of Human Trafficking and Modern-Day
Slavery, in THE DANGERS OF FASHION: TOWARDS ETHICAL AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS
103, 103 (Sara B. Marcketti & Elena Karpova eds., 2020) (describing the working
conditions of an estimated 21 million forced laborers).
27
Edward Broughton, The Bhopal Disaster and Its Aftermath: A Review, 4 ENV’T
HEALTH 1, 1 (2005) (describing the details of the disaster).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30

The Triangle fire played a critical role in transforming the ways in which
the legal culture attributed causes to industrial accidents, which were a
main focus of political debate at the time. . . . As the change it wrought in
public thinking about industrial accidents became manifest in legislative
reform, however, the Triangle fire contributed significantly to shaping the
worldview that underlay 20th-century public life and legal institutions.
McEvoy, supra note 2, at 626.
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Bhopal environmental pollution tragedy, and in data on the
prevalence of modern-day slavery.31
In light of this failure, one important legal response has been the
emergence of private transnational regulatory organizations, 32
which develop and maintain semi-binding regulatory schemes. 33
Most of these private transnational regulators (PTRs) have a dual
functionality: they operate both as standard-setting organizations
that produce prescriptive behavioral guidelines predominantly
focusing on firms,34 and as compliance agents, responsible for the
enforcement of such guidelines and standards.35 PTRs operate in
diverse areas, ranging from labor rights (child labor, compulsory
labor, and workplace discrimination, working hours and
remuneration, occupational health, and safety standards) 36 to
31
Dickson & Warren, supra note 26. Another prominent example of this
phenomenon is the ship-recycling industry, which is dominated by Bangladesh,
India, and Pakistan and is similarly characterized by a poor environmental record
and unsafe and abusive working conditions. See, e.g., George M. Cairns, Return to
Chittagong: Ten Years Since the “Postcard”, 14 CRITICAL PERSPS. ON INT’L BUS. 340, 341
(2017) (arguing that working conditions in Bangladesh have not improved since
2007); Hasan Ruhan Rabbi & Aevelina Rahman, Ship Breaking and Recycling Industry
of Bangladesh; Issues and Challenges, 194 PROCEDIA ENGINEERING 254, 256 (2017)
(discussing environmental pollution caused by ship breaking industry in
Bangladesh).
32
See Math Göbbels & Jan Jonker, AA1000 and SA8000 Compared: A Systematic
Comparison of Contemporary Accountability Standards, 18 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 54,
54 (2003) (explaining the emergence of private regulatory standards as a response
to growing gaps left by traditional legal institutions); Dirk Ulrich Gilbert, Andreas
Rasche & Sandra Waddock, Accountability in a Global Economy: The Emergence of
International Accountability Standards, 21 BUS. ETHICS Q. 23, 25 (2011) (attributing the
emergence of private transnational regulation to the “lack of transnational
regulation of social and environmental issues related to corporate activity,” and
arguing that this regime is “a mechanism to fill the omnipresent governance voids
which the rise of the global economy has created”).
33
See Gilbert et al., supra note 32, at 24 (explaining that private transnational
regulation is primarily voluntary, but also allows for some forms of “soft law”
regulations).
34
See, e.g., Göbbels & Jonker, supra note 32, at 55-56 (describing the
frameworks of PTRs, AA1000, and SA8000).
35
See id. (discussing audits and reviews provided by the PTRs).
36
See, e.g., Richard Locke, Thomas Kochan, Monica Romis & Fei Qin, Beyond
Corporate Codes of Conduct: Work Organization and Labour Standards at Nike’s Suppliers,
146 INT’L LAB. REV. 21, 21-22 (2007) (studying the effectiveness private “codes of
conduct” on regulating and improving working conditions); Göbbels & Jonker,
supra note 32, at 55-56 (explaining SA8000 accountability standard designed for
improving working conditions); Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of
Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental
Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOCIO. 297, 297-298 (2007) (introducing emergence of PTR to
“address the social and environmental conditions of production”).
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environmental standards37 and fair-trade standards.38 Examples of
PTRs include organizations such as Fairtrade International, 39
SA8000, 40 Responsible Care, 41 ISO 14001, 42 and Global Compact. 43
Firms that are willing to commit to the standards set by these
organizations can apply to become members or be certified by them.
The emergence of private transnational regulation has been
driven, in part, by the decline of the international treaty system and
its increasing inability to respond to global risks. The failure of the
World Health Organization (WHO) to properly coordinate the
global response to the coronavirus crisis provides a forceful
demonstration of the weaknesses of the global governance system.44
As we show below, global organizations such as the International
Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP), and the WHO are increasingly seeking to forge
partnerships with private regulators in order to overcome their
37
See, e.g., Charlotte Streck, Filling in for Governments? The Role of the Private
Actors in the International Climate Regime, 17 J. FOR EUR. ENV’T & PLAN. L. 5, 7 (2020)
(discussing roles of private actors in the climate regime); Thomas Hale,
Transnational Actors and Transnational Governance in Global Environmental Politics, 23
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203, 203-05 (2020) (discussing roles of transnational actors and
governance in global environmental politics); Oren Perez, The Green Economy
Paradox: A Critical Inquiry into Sustainability Indexes, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 153,
155-60 (2016) (providing a critique of the green economy thesis the context of
sustainability indexes).
38
See, e.g., Bartley, supra note 3636, at 297; Elizabeth A. Bennett, Governance,
Legitimacy, and Stakeholder Balance: Lessons from Fairtrade International, 12 SOC. ENTER.
J. 322, 327 (2016) (discussing Fairtrade International which sets standards for
adopting enviornmentally sustainable practices).
39
Aims
of
the
Fairtrade
Standards,
FAIRTRADE
INT’L,
https://www.fairtrade.net/standard/aims [https://perma.cc/A256-CCJL] (last
visited Jan. 25, 2022); see Bennett, supra note 3838 (examining the operations of
Fairtrade International and explaining its decision to include or exclude products
from certification).
40
Göbbels & Jonker, supra note 32, at 56.
41
Aseem Prakash, Responsible Care: An Assessment, 39 BUS. & SOC’Y 183, 184
(2000).
42
ISO 14000 Family Environmental Management, INT’L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION,
https://www.iso.org/iso-14001-environmentalmanagement.html [https://perma.cc/AR7R-T6H4] (last visited Jan. 25, 2022);
Magali Delmas & Ivan Montiel, The Diffusion of Voluntary International Management
Standards: Responsible Care, ISO 9000 and ISO 14001 in the Chemical Industry, 36 POL’Y
STUD. J. 65, 70 (2008).
43
Oliver F. Williams, The UN Global Compact: The Challenge and the Promise, 14
BUS. ETHICS Q. 755, 755-57 (2004).
44
Lawrence O. Gostin, Roojin Habibi & Benjamin Mason Meier, Has Global
Health Law Risen to Meet the COVID-19 Challenge? Revisiting the International Health
Regulations to Prepare for Future Threats, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 376, 378-79 (2020).
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institutional deficit. PTRs provide an additional layer of regulation,
operating alongside global public law (such as the ILO and
international environmental conventions) and domestic law
(national environmental, health and safety, and workers’ rights
regulations).
The increasing role played by PTRs in global governance
processes raises, however, a meta-regulatory dilemma. Namely, to
what extent PTRs can be trusted to provide appropriate solutions to
the problem of low regulatory standards in developing countries.
Thus, consumers might intuitively trust a “fair trade” label,
especially if they (wrongly) assume that such labels are backed by
international or state regulators. Knowing that these certifications
are given by private organizations, can we simply assume they
represent candid and rigorous regulatory efforts?
The Ali Enterprises case vividly illustrates the dilemma. The Ali
Enterprises Factory in Karachi was certified by SA8000 code of
conduct, which provides detailed standards for decent work
conditions, including provisions on health and safety,
discrimination, working hours, disciplinary practices, and
remuneration.45 Yet, as it can be observed from the Ali Enterprises
Factory disaster itself, whether private regulation can provide
effective solutions remains in doubt. Scholars have raised various
questions regarding the credibility of private regulation. 46 First,
PTRs are not subject to formal supervision by public international
law bodies such as the ILO or UNEP or by national regulators. This
45
See SA8000 Standard, SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, https://saintl.org/programs/sa8000/ [https://perma.cc/8G95-WMFJ] (last visited Jan. 25,
2022) (describing SA8000).
[S]A 8000 defines the minimum requirements for workplace conditions
that need to be met by production facilities and their suppliers.
Independent audits are based on the behavioural rules defined by SA
8000. These rules cover eight essential areas: child labour, forced labour,
health and safety, freedom of association and right to collective
bargaining, discrimination, discipline, working hours and compensation
....
Andreas Rasche, The Limits of Corporate Responsibility Standards, 19 BUS. ETHICS EUR.
REV. 280, 284 (2010).
46
See Rasche, supra note 45, 285-89 (analyzing the limits and implications of
SA8000); Locke et al., supra note 3636, at 22-24 (noting the debate over whether
private codes and conducts are working) corporations); HUM. RTS. WATCH,
“WHOEVER RAISES THEIR HEAD SUFFERS THE MOST”: WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN
BANGLADESH’S
GARMENT
FACTORIES
58-61
(2015),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/bangladesh0415_web_0.p
df [https://perma.cc/7RD4-H9TD] (describing how companies failed to change
working conditions with their codes).
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means that they mainly operate in response to private market forces,
public pressure from civil society organizations, and collegial
monitoring by other PTRs. Second, it is not clear whether these
market and civic pressures provide PTRs with sufficient incentives
to set appropriate standards and verify their enforcement. The
concern raised by critics is that PTRs are used to whitewash or
greenwash the illnesses of production in developing nations in order
to keep prices low for consumers in the West.47
In this Article, we propose a novel remedy to this problem. We
suggest holding PTRs directly liable in tort for harms that were
caused due to their negligence in either setting the standard or in
enforcing it on market participants. This proposal fills a significant
gap in existing literature, which focuses on the responsibility of
transnational firms, and not on the accountability of transnational
regulators.48
To illustrate our proposal, consider again the Ali Enterprises
Factory fire described above. According to our proposal, in the Ali
Enterprises case, the organizations behind the SA8000 standard—
Social Accountability International (SAI) and Social Accountability
Accreditation Services (SAAS)—could be held liable for the
damages caused by the fire if it is determined that the safety
provisions in the SA8000 standard were unreasonable, or if the
standard was not effectively enforced by the private regulator. If
private regulators are held liable in this way, this will provide them
with the missing incentive to assure appropriate standards are set
and, more importantly, enforced. The justification behind our
proposal is simple: preventing industrial accidents can only be
achieved if someone is made responsible when such accidents occur.
As long as both employers and private regulators are systematically
not held liable for the damages caused to workers due to
unreasonable industrial risks, it would be naïve to expect such risks
to spontaneously disappear. By holding private regulators liable in
47
See Locke et al., supra note 36, at 22 (“[C]odes of conduct and voluntary
monitoring regimes . . . are designed not to protect labour rights or improve
working conditions but instead to limit the legal liability of global brands and
prevent damage to their reputation.”).
48
The following studies all focus on MNE accountability: LISE SMIT ET AL., EUR.
COMM’N, STUDY ON DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE SUPPLY CHAIN:
FINAL REPORT (2020); Benedikt Reinke & Peer C. Zumbansen, Transnational Liability
Regimes in Contract, Tort and Corporate Law: Comparative Observations on ‘Global
Supply Chain Liability’ (Dickinson Poon Sch. of L., King’s Coll. London, TLI Think!
Paper No. 4, 2019); Peter Rott & Vibe Ulfbeck, Supply Chain Liability of Multinational
Corporations?, 23 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 415 (2015).
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tort, we fill the gap in the existing private law toolbox and
strengthen the global governance system. We show that this
solution is in line with existing principles of tort law, compare it to
other possible legal solutions, discuss its advantages and limitations,
and the legal possibility for its implementation. We also show that
our approach reinforces already existing trends for public-private
collaboration between treaty organizations and PTRs.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II details the difficulties
that local and international legal systems encounter in trying to
regulate global markets. It explains that legal systems in developing
countries are easily caught in a race-to-the-bottom and tend to not
develop regulatory regimes that will limit the profitability of
multinational enterprises (MNEs). For these reasons, protection of
workers and citizens in southern regions must come from
transnational and global mechanisms and cannot originate solely in
national legal frameworks. Part III reviews recent developments in
the use of private regulators and certification schemes designed to
contend with the challenges of regulating the global economy. It
explains the limitations of these emerging regimes, especially their
lack of formal legal authority supported by the state administrative
machinery. In light of these difficulties, Part IV moves on to present
our proposal of tort liability for transnational private regulators. It
offers a detailed analysis of the proposed regime and a discussion of
possible counter arguments.
It also explores the projected
consequences of our proposal, especially focusing on its potential
network effects. A short conclusion follows.
II.

THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

Regulatory standards in developing nations lag behind those in
developed countries. 49 The sources of this pervasive lag are
multifaceted.
First, in a highly competitive global market
environment in which capital has become highly mobile, developing
countries find it increasingly more difficult to raise the level of their
environmental, safety, or labor standards and to develop strong
enforcement mechanisms, out of fear of undermining the
competitive edge of their local industries or of losing manufacturers

49

Blackman et al., supra note 25, at 381.
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to jurisdictions that offer more lenient regulatory environments. 50
Second, the capacity of many developed countries to introduce
regulatory reforms and improve environmental and safety
standards has been undermined by widespread corruption within
their administrative bureaucracy.51
These forces hinder development and improvement of safety
and environmental standards on all legal fronts. In this Part, we
examine the shortcomings of traditional legal frameworks in
regulating the safety and environmental behavior of manufacturing
firms operating in developing countries. We study both public law
and private law regimes, operated both locally and internationally.
a. The Limits of Traditional Public Law Solutions
As a starting point, existing research tends to turn to public law
schemes as the natural framework for setting environmental and
safety standards. As we show below, the success of public law
instruments in changing the situation in developing countries has
been limited.
i.

National Regulation

One of the key features of the globalization process has been the
offshoring of production to developing countries. 52 Multinational
50
See William W. Olney, A Race to the Bottom? Employment Protection and
Foreign Direct Investment, 9 J. INT’L ECON. 191, 191-93 (2013) (offering evidence for
race to the bottom dynamics in labor and environmental standards, caused by trade
liberalization in developing countries). In some cases, this dynamic leads to
regulatory chill rather than race to the bottom. See Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill
in a Warming World: The Threat to Climate Policy Posed by Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, 7 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 229, 232 (2018) (explaining different types of
regulatory chill).
51
See Bernhard Reinsberg, Thomas Stubbs, Alexander Kentikelenis &
Lawrence King, Bad Governance: How Privatization Increases Corruption in the
Developing World, 14 REG. & GOVERNANCE 698, 700-03 (2020) (showing evidence
linking corruption and privatization); Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr., Fighting Corruption
in Developing Countries: Some Aspects of Policy from Lessons from the Field, 17 J. PUB.
AFFS., 1683, 1683 (2017) (“Corruption persists in developing countries . . . .”);
Benjamin A. Olken & Rohini Pande, Corruption in Developing Countries, 4 ANN. REV.
ECON. 479, 480 (2012) (evaluating the cost of corruption in developing countries).
52
Bernard et al., supra note 24Error! Bookmark not defined.; Gereffi &
Memedovic, supra note 24; Kumar, supra note 24Error! Bookmark not defined..
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companies and transnational supply chains have increasingly
moved production to the global south, for various reasons. 53
Demand from the developed world has also spurred domestic
growth of independent, domestic producers. This important change
is intimately connected to the lax regulatory standards common in
developing countries and to their relative inability to provide legal
protection to vulnerable classes.54
This dynamic contributes to a special—and severe—breed of
regulatory capture. Regulatory capture is always a significant
concern because regulators, effected by powerful commercial
lobbies, might drift to represent industry interests instead of the
interests of the general public.55 In the case of developing countries
and the regulation of transnational production, this risk is especially
pronounced. Big businesses in the global north—buyers in the
transnational supply chain—enjoy a privileged market position.
Such business entities therefore enjoy the capacity to weaken
regulatory structures in the global south, allowing them to influence
labor standards in manufacturing firms in developing countries.
This can be done directly through bargaining and through insistence
on low manufacturing prices, or indirectly through lobbying
efforts.56 Often, developing countries lack the regulatory capacity to
enforce labor standards, meaning that even if developing countries
set higher standards, manufacturing firms can shirk their regulatory
obligation in order not to increase their production costs.
Another aspect of the problem is that developing countries are
locked in a destructive race-to-the bottom when attempting to
regulate transnational markets. Developing countries have a strong
economic interest in appealing to buyer-firms and attracting their
business. Since high regulatory standards impose a cost on
production, developing countries will be reluctant to set and enforce
Bernard et al., supra note 24.
See Olney, supra note 50, at 191-93 (discussing the phenomena of race to the
bottom in developing countries).
55
See Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y, 203, 204-07 (2006) (reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on
regulatory capture); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government
Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089, 1089 (1991)
(finding that “the threat of producer protection leads to low-powered incentive
schemes for regulated firms.”).
56
See Philip James, David Walters, Helen Sampson & Emma Wadsworth,
Regulating the Employment Dynamics of Domestic Supply Chains, 57 J. INDUS. RELS. 526,
527-30 (2015) (explaining the role of domestic supply chain regulation in protecting
workplace standards).
53
54
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them. Regulators in developing countries therefore might set
regulatory standards too low, or at least be reluctant to increase
regulatory demands. 57
The race-to-the-bottom dynamic is
straightforward: buyer firms seek cheap production opportunities
in developing countries; developing countries, in response, are
forced to compete amongst themselves to offer attractive conditions,
including low regulatory standards. This means that even if
political conditions within the country could allow for raising
regulatory standards, transnational market pressures can easily
prevent this.
ii.

International Public Law Regulation

As we described above, developing countries are gripped in a
race-to-the-bottom, which results in low environmental and safety
standards. The competitive pressures that the global economic
order imposes on developing nations make it very difficult for them
to set standards that are stricter than those that exist in other
developing countries. The only way in which this destructive raceto-the-bottom dynamic can be countered is through international
collaborative regulatory initiatives that bring together developed
and developing countries. Unfortunately, attempts to use global
public law mechanisms to create collective regulatory solutions had
only limited success.
We offer two key examples for this global failure. Consider first
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In September 2015, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development that includes seventeen Sustainable
Development Goals.58 Building on the principle of “leaving no one
behind,” the new Agenda emphasizes a holistic approach to
achieving sustainable development for all.59 Among the SDGs are
57
See David Graham & Ngaire Woods, Making Corporate Self-Regulation
Effective in Developing Countries, 34 WORLD DEV. 868, 868-69 (2006) (describing the
“regulatory capacity problems faced by developing states”).
58
G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development (Oct. 21, 2015).
59
The 17 Goals, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFS.: SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
https://sdgs.un.org/goals [https://perma.cc/3KTE-WJGC] (last visited Jan. 26,
2022); Christian Kroll, Anne Warchold & Prajal Pradhan, Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs): Are We Successful in Turning Trade-Offs into Synergies?, 5 PALGRAVE

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss3/2

2022]

Tort as Meta-Regulation

681

goals that target decent work conditions (SDG 8), reduced inequality
and gender equality (SDGs 10 and 5), stronger environmental
commitments on both local and global levels (SDGs 6, 13, 14, 15),
and responsible consumption and production (SDG 12). The United
Nations Resolution A/RES/70/1 includes a specific provision, in
section 67, calling upon businesses to take part in realizing the SDGs:
We call upon all businesses to apply their creativity and
innovation to solving sustainable development challenges.
We will foster a dynamic and well-functioning business
sector, while protecting labour rights and environmental and
health standards in accordance with relevant international
standards and agreements and other ongoing initiatives in
this regard, such as the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights and the labour standards of the International
Labour Organization, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and key multilateral environmental agreements, for
parties to those agreements.60
The SDG programme had some impact on corporate practices,
and on the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) universe more
broadly. For example, a recent PricewaterhouseCoopers report,
based on a survey of global companies, notes that seventy-one
percent of the business participants say they are already planning
their responses to the SDGs.61 Jan Anton van Zanten and Rob van
Tulder conducted a survey of eighty-two large MNEs in North
America and Europe included in the 2015 Financial Times Global
500, and similarly found a high level of engagement with the SDGs
targets. Companies indicated particularly high contributions to
SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic
Growth), SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production), SDG

COMMC’NS, 2019, at 1, 2 (describing the trade-offs necessary to accomplish the
seventeen Sustainable Development Goals and analyzing whether the agenda is
achievable); see also Mary Menton et al., Environmental Justice and the SDGs: From
Synergies to Gaps and Contradictions, 15 SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 1621, 1621 (2020)
(introducing SDG and its varying effects between countries).
60
G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 58, ¶ 67 (footnote omitted).
61
PWC, MAKING IT YOUR BUSINESS: ENGAGING WITH THE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
GOALS
9
(2015),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/sustainability/SDG/SDG%20Research_FINAL.p
df [https://perma.cc/GJ83-Z77X].
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13 (Climate Action), SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions),
and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals).62
However, the voluntary structure of the SDG programme, raises
doubts regarding its capacity to realize its goals. The United
Nations resolution clarifies that “[o]ur Governments have the
primary responsibility for follow-up and review, at the national,
regional and global levels, in relation to the progress made in
implementing the Goals and targets over the coming fifteen years.”63
The primary regulatory mechanism that will be used to foster
compliance with the programme is “systematic follow-up and
review,” which will be coordinated by the high-level political forum
under the auspices of the General Assembly and the Economic and
Social Council. 64 Neither of these bodies has compliance powers
(especially not against private businesses, which are not parties to
the United Nations system).
The weaknesses of the SDG programme with respect to
corporate actors have been corroborated by studies that examined
more closely the impact of the SDG programme on corporate
behavior. Thus, for example, van der Waal and Thijssens examined
the sustainability reports of companies included in the Forbes
Global 2000 universe. 65 The results suggest that corporate SDG
involvement is overall still limited (twenty-three percent of sample),
and intentional rather than actual. The authors find that SDG
reporting is mainly symbolic and is undertaken by corporations in a
context of impression management.
They find that SDG
involvement is largely described in broad terms, expressed as
intentions, opportunities, and future actions, and that companies
remain silent on current actions taken, explicit business cases,
measurement of SDG outcomes or ways in which SDGs can be
operationalized.66
62
Jan Anton van Zanten & Rob Van Tulder, Multinational Enterprises and the
Sustainable Development Goals: An Institutional Approach to Corporate Engagement, 1 J.
INT’L BUS. POL’Y 208, 220 (2018).
63
G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 58, ¶ 47.
64
G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 58, ¶ 47.
65
Johannes W.H. van der Waal & Thomas Thijssens, Corporate Involvement in
Sustainable Development Goals: Exploring the Territory, 252 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 1,
3 (2020).
66
Id. at 9; Macellari et al. provide further confirmation to this argument in a
recent study of the disclosure practices of United Nations Global Compact LEAD
members. Margherita Macellari, Alexander Yuriev, Francesco Testa & Olivier
Boiral, Exploring Bluewashing Practices of Alleged Sustainability Leaders Through a
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The regulatory weaknesses of the SDG programme reflect a
more general problem in the field of international environmental
law: the lack of a robust and effective compliance framework.
Without such a framework, compliance with the myriad global
environmental treaties remains partial at best. The results of this
shortcoming are reflected in the deteriorating state of the earth
ecological system.67
A similar situation exists in the domain of global labor law. The
effort to develop a global governance system that ensures decent
working conditions for workers across the world has a long
history.68 Starting in 1919, a complex body of regulations has begun
to evolve, with the adoption of the first six International Labor
Organization (ILO) Conventions. The ILO has sought to provide a
global regulatory framework that includes procedural rights such as
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining,
substantive rights like paid holidays, maternity leave and minimum
or living wages, and standards pertaining to occupational health
and safety.69 This regulatory framework, consisting of a myriad of
conventions and protocols, attempts to operate both internationally
and intra-nationally, and to shape both global market relations as
Counter-Accounting Analysis, 86 ENV’T IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 1, 1 (2021). LEAD
companies belong to an exclusive group of companies that have demonstrated
leadership in one or more SDG issues. Global Compact LEAD, UNITED NATIONS GLOB.
COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/take-action/leadership/gc-lead
[https://perma.cc/7V47-A6AU] (last visited Jan. 26, 2022). They find a low
propensity of United Nations Global Compact LEAD members to disclose
information about significant negative events in their sustainability reports
(consistent with the greenwashing literature). Macellari et al., supra. More than
eighty percent of identified events were not reported or were only partially
reported. Macellari et al., supra, at 8.
67
See Louis J. Kotze, Earth System Law for the Anthropocene, 11 SUSTAINABILITY,
2019, at 1, 3-5 (explaining the “failures and deficiencies of international
environmental law”). For more background information on deterioration of the
earth ecological system, see generally Levente Hufnagel, Melinda Pálinkás, Ferenc
Mics & Réka Homoródi, Introductory Chapter: The Present Global Ecological Crisis in
the Light of the Mass Extinctions of Earth History, in CHANGING ECOSYSTEMS AND THEIR
SERVICES (Levente Hufnagel ed., 2020); ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION:
AN UNNATURAL HISTORY (2014).
68
James Heintz, Global Labor Standards: Their Impact and Implementation 13
(Univ. of Mass. Pol. Econ. Rsch. Inst. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 046, 2002),
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=peri
_workingpapers [https://perma.cc/9MU6-3HVP].
69
Stephanie Luce, The Case for International Labour Standards: A “Northern”
Perspective 3 (Brighton Univ. of Sussex, IDS Working Paper No. 250, 2005); Philip
Alston, Core Labour Standards and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights
Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 457, 487-88 (2004).
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well as the regulatory practices within nation states. However,
despite its long history, the ILO has failed to produce a robust
institutional structure that could ensure global compliance with its
myriad rules.70
The ILO worker rights conventions serve as a good illustration
of this public law failure. In a recent study, Dursun Peksen and
Robert G. Blanton have examined the impact of the ratification of
core ILO Conventions on the level of respect for workers’ rights,
based on data analysis for the period 1981-2011.71 They found “the
ratification of ILO Conventions to be negatively related to the
protection of worker rights.”72 The authors argue that these findings
reflect the paradoxical impact of ILO Conventions:
States thus have an incentive to ratify ILO Conventions, as
they provide a visible signal of support for these standards.
At the same time, the ILO has no mechanism to enforce labor
standards. . . . This combination of factors creates a “perfect
storm” for radical decoupling, as treaties “serve to relieve
pressure for real change in performance” and give states a
shield to tolerate further labor rights violations.73
In a recent study, Joseph LaDou provides a similar critique of the
ILO’s SafeWork programme, arguing that it failed to increase
worldwide awareness to the risks of work-related accidents and to
promote compliance with ILO Conventions on occupational safety
and health.74
Finally, attempts to develop an international binding regulatory
instrument, that will obligate transnational corporations to respect
70
See Thomas Payne, Retooling the ILO: How a New Enforcement Wing Can Help the
ILO Reach Its Goal Through Regional Free Trade Agreements, 24 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD.
597, 607 (2017) (“[B]ecause of an enforcement issue, [the ILO has] fallen short of
establishing binding international labor standards.”); Velibor Jakovleski, Scott Jerbi &
Thomas Biersteker, The ILO’s Role in Global Governance: Limits and Potential, in THE
ILO @ 100, at 82, 97 (Christophe Gironde & Gilles Carbonnier eds., 2019) (deeming
ILO’s attempts at setting global labor standards as failures).
71
Dursun Peksen & Robert G. Blanton, The Impact of ILO Conventions on Worker
Rights: Are Empty Promises Worse than No Promises?, 12 REV. INT’L ORGS. 75, 75 (2017).
72
Id. at 90.
73
Id. at 77.
74
Joseph LaDou, A World of False Promises: International Labour Organization,
World Health Organization, and the Plea of Workers Under Neoliberalism, 50 INT’L J.
HEALTH SERVS. 314, 318 (2020). For the SafeWork programme, see SafeWork, INT’L
LAB. ORG., https://www.ilo.org/moscow/areas-of-work/occupational-safetyand-health/WCMS_249271/lang--en/index.htm [https://perma.cc/S4CE-3VBY]
(last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
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human and labor rights and environmental interests, have so far
been futile. The most recent attempt in this context has been the
adoption of the United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution
26/9, which in 2014 tasked the Open-Ended Intergovernmental
Working Group (OEIGWG) with developing such an instrument.75
In October 2020, the Chair of the OEIGWG issued a second revised
draft of a “[l]egally binding instrument to regulate, in international
human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and
other business enterprises.”76 However, the instrument still has to
receive the formal support of developed countries, and more
importantly, it does not foresee the imposition of direct human
rights obligations on MNEs, but is basically a mediatory instrument:
“it obliges State parties to adopt and improve their domestic laws in
order to hold business actors to account.”77
b. Traditional Private Law Mechanisms
In addition to regulatory enforcement, firms can be induced to
invest in minimizing the harms of their activity out of fear of a

75
Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, at 2 (July
14, 2014).
76
Open-Ended
Intergovernmental
Working
Group
(OEIGWG)
Chairmanship, OHCHR, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International
Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business
Enterprises,
Second
Revised
Draft
(June
8,
2020),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Ses
sion6/OEIGWG_ChairRapporteur_second_revised_draft_LBI_on_TNCs_and_OBEs_with_respect_to_H
uman_Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ5V-T8SC]; see Anne Trebilcock, The Rana
Plaza Disaster Seven Years on: Transnational Experiments and Perhaps a New Treaty?,
159 INT’L LAB. REV. 545, 558-63 (2020) (discussing the proposed instrument).
77
Anne Peters, Sabine Gless, Chris Thomale & Marc-Philippe Weller,
Business and Human Rights: Making the Legally Binding Instrument Work in Public,
Private and Criminal Law 1 (MPIL Rsch. Paper Series, No. 2020-06, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561482 [https://perma.cc/9ZKP-DC9F]; see, e.g., U.S.
Mission Geneva, The U.S. Government’s Continued Opposition to the Business and
Human Rights Treaty Process, U.S. MISSION TO INT’L ORGS. IN GENEVA (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/10/16/the-united-states-governmentscontinued-opposition-to-the-business-human-rights-treatyprocess/[https://perma.cc/V3V2-UZE4] (showing lack of support for the
instrument from one of the developed countries).
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private suit brought by victims who suffer the harm.78 This section
shows that such mechanisms, although in theory supposed to offer
effective solutions, are too often insufficient to provide appropriate
response in the context of global production networks.
Generally, private law remedies do not provide credible and
robust alternatives to the foregoing public law failures, due to
several concurring reasons. First, local manufacturers often have
insufficient resources to compensate accident victims.79 Second, the
judicial systems in many developing countries do not have the
necessary resources and the know-how to deal with mass tort
cases.80 Third, when the accident involves transnational chains of
ownership or supply, victims face significant hurdles in bringing a
lawsuit against either the parent company or the purchaser.81 These
hurdles consist of both jurisdictional barriers (e.g., forum non
78
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873 (1998) (“[T]o achieve appropriate deterrence,
injurers should be made to pay for the harm their conduct generates.”); John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A
Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1927-31 (2010)
(discussing tort law’s deterrence effect and contribution to product). But see A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1437, 1453-54 (2010) (arguing that product liability’s effect on risk reduction
is marginal).
79
See S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45
(1986) (noting that when the parties have less assets than liabilities they might
cause, there is a lack of appropriate incentive to prevent accidents).
80
See, e.g., EDWIN MUJIH, REGULATING MULTINATIONALS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: A CONCEPTUAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 91-120 (2012) (discussing a tort case from Chad); Fan Yang, Ting
Zhang & Hao Zhang, Adjudicating Environmental Tort Cases in China: Burden of Proof,
Causation, and Insights from 513 Court Decisions, 21 ASIA PAC. J. ENV’T L. 171, 172
(2018) (“Generally, environmental tort plaintiffs face enormous obstacles in
bringing cases to courts. Chinese courts have set stringent bars to accepting cases.”).
See also Ngozi F. Stewart, A Proposal of Reforms for Effective Environmental
Management in Nigeria, 31 AJAYI CROWTHER U.L.J. 1, 24 (2017):

Nigerian judges usually have little or no capacity to effectively adjudicate
and manage the environmental cases before them. Some of the judges are
hardly updated on developments in law, rules and jurisprudence on
environmental matters; also, some of the judges have low sensitivity levels
in the resolution of environmental disputes.
81
See, e.g., KIM FORTUN, ADVOCACY AFTER BHOPAL: ENVIRONMENTALISM,
DISASTER, NEW GLOBAL ORDERS 25-27 (2009) (observing the difficulties of bringing
claims against the parent company located in the United States for harms done in
Bhopal); Shamil Shams, German retailer KiK compensates Pakistan’s ‘industrial 9/11’
families, DW (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/german-retailer-kikcompensates-pakistans-industrial-9-11-families/a-37470138
[https://perma.cc/J6ZH-PUUK] (noting Pakistanis struggling to hold a
multinational German company accountable).
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conveniens doctrine)82 as well as various private law and corporate
law doctrines. Victims and their families are therefore left without
legal recourse against either the local factory or firms further down
the transnational supply chain.
i.

Traditional Tort Claims

The most direct way to hold firms responsible for the harmful
outcomes of their activity is through the use of a tort action.83 Thus,
in the case of the Ali Enterprises Factory fire, workers and their
families could theoretically sue the factory owners for the harms
they suffered. Unfortunately, such claims are rarely successful.
While similar tort claims might offer valuable recourse in the United
States or in other developed economies, in Pakistan, where the Ali
Enterprises Factory fire took place, such venue for recourse is often
irrelevant for workers.84
One reason for this is that the capital structure of manufacturing
factories in developing countries is usually too thin, making them
unable to compensate victims.
Theoretically this difficulty,
described in the literature as the ‘judgment proof’ problem,85 could
be corrected by requiring manufacturing firms to purchase

82
Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1444
(2011) (describing the forum non conveniens doctrine, allowing a defendant to seek
dismissal of the claim based on the argument that a foreign court is a more
appropriate forum for hearing the suit).
83
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ECONOMICS: VOLUME 3, at 1661, 1667 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds., 2002) (“[W]e will view the primary social function of the liability system as the
provision of incentives to prevent harm.”).
84
See Rashid Jalali, Frustration of the Law of Torts In Pakistan, COURTING THE
LAW:
COMMENTARY
(July
27,
2017),
https://courtingthelaw.com/2017/07/27/commentary/frustration-of-the-law-oftorts-in-pakistan/ [https://perma.cc/QK8S-6RLJ] (discussing the inability of tort
law in Pakistan to offer recourse to plaintiffs, mainly due to insufficient funding of
the judicial system).
85
Shavell, supra note 79, at 46.
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environmental and accident insurance. 86 But such obligation is
rarely imposed in developing countries.87
In addition, direct tort claims in developing countries can be
problematic due to lack of funding, corruption in the local judicial
system,88 or doctrinal limitations in the structure of local laws.89 The
judicial system in developing countries is typically underfunded,
often badly managed, 90 and characterized by an extremely low
judge to population ratio. 91 Under such conditions, tort suits are
typically pushed to the end of the line, as the courts are swamped
and prioritize criminal cases. This means civil lawsuits are typically
not adjudicated for many years, if ever. 92 For instance, in India,
studies show that only a very low number of tort cases are
adjudicated every year.93
86
Susan Rose‐Ackerman, Public Law Versus Private Law in Environmental
Regulation: European Union Proposals in the Light of United States Experience, 4 REV.
EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENV’T L. 312, 313 (1995).
87
See Pornpimol Kongtip, Witaya Yoosook & Suttinun Chantanakul,
Occupational Health and Safety Management in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: An
Overview of the Situation in Thailand, 46 SAFETY SCI. 1356, 1360 (2008) (reporting less
than forty percent of SMEs in Thailand provide accident insurance for workers);
Yan Feng, Arthur P.J. Mol, Yonglong Lu, Guizhen He & C.S.A. van Koppen,
Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance in China: In Need of Strong Government
Backing, 43 AMBIO 687, 701 (2014) (noting that the Chinese pollution insurance
market remains immature due to a lack of strong state intervention).
88
Doe v. Nestle, SA, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (alleging
corruption as a reason for the plaintiffs’ inability to sue in their place of
employment, ivory coast).
89
Id.
90
See Marc Galanter, “To the Listed Field . . .”: The Myth of Litigious India, 1
JINDAL GLOB. L. REV. 65, 71 (2009) [hereinafter Galanter] (noting relatively low
number of judges per capita for India).
91
Id. (citing a ratio of one judge per 100,000 people in India, with a small
number of courts available); Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased
Informalism: Lok Adalats and Legal Rights in Modern India, in BEYOND COMMON
KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 96, 99 (Erik G. Jensen &
Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) (describing very low judge to population ratio in
India).
92
See Galanter, supra note 90, at 72 (noting long delays for cases in district and
subordinate courts in India); see also Timothy J. O’Neill, Through a Glass Darkly:
Western Tort Law from a South and East Asian Perspective, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV.
1, 12 (2009) (“Indian courts are over-loaded, with the backlog of cases causing years
of delays”).
93
Marc Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India After the
Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEX. INT’L L.J. 273, 275 (1985) [hereinafter Legal Torpor] (noting
absence of tort cases in India); Marc Galanter, Bhopals, Past and Present: The Changing
Legal Response to Mass Disaster, 10 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 151, 154 (1990)
[hereinafter Bhopals, Past and Present] (“India has an undeveloped tort law. Few tort
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Finally, tort claims often encounter barriers in substantive law of
developing countries. Local legal systems in developing countries
offer a complex and multilayered network of semi-autonomous,
cohabiting legal orders.94 Such legal systems can contain layers of
local customary law, religious law, colonial law (usually German,
French, or British) and finally modern (often socialist) law of the
modern independent state. 95 These layers represent a process of
stratification, by which each layer is superimposed on top of
another, without completely replacing it.96 This complex system is
difficult for private claimants to navigate, and often does not
provide remedies for accident victims in the fashion now accepted
as the norm in the United States or in Europe.97
ii.

Suing Down the Supply Chain

To overcome the difficulties described above, victims of harm
could try and sue down the supply chain in an attempt to hold either
a parent company or a contractual buyer liable for the harms created
by manufacturers. The economic logic of such claims is simple: by
suing the buyer-firm or parent company directly (instead of suing
the local employer), victims can gain access to the western
company’s deep pocket and enjoy more favorable legal institutions
in the courts of developed economies. There is also a moral logic in
such claims, since in many cases companies in the west enter
contractual relations with manufacturers in the South in full
recognition of the problematic working conditions and the
environmental risks that exist in their facilities.98
cases are brought.”); see O’Neill, supra note 92, at 10-11 (providing statistics showing
very few tort cases in Indian courts); Galanter, supra note 90, at 68-70 (arguing that
India has one of the lowest civil court uses); see also Marc Galanter, Law’s Elusive
Promise: Learning from Bhopal, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION
AND POWER DISPARITIES 172 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002) [hereinafter Law’s Elusive
Promise].
94
See Mauro Bussani, Tort Law and Development: Insights into the Case of Ethiopia
and Eritrea, 40 J. AFR. L. 43, 47 (1996) (noting legal pluralism in African countries
caused by new legal orders cohabiting with the old).
95
Id. at 46-47.
96
Id. at 47.
97
Id. at 48.
98
See Stephen Chen, Multinational Corporate Power, Influence and Responsibility
in Global Supply Chains, 148 J. BUS. ETHICS 365, 370-71 (2018) (applying the idea of
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However, such claims typically face significant legal hurdles.
We should distinguish in this context between cases in which the
defendant company is linked to the local firm through corporate
ownership, and cases in which the links are only contractual. The
English case of Chandler v. Cape99 provides an example of cases of the
first type. Employees of the South African company Cape Building
Products Ltd (“Cape Products”) have filed a claim against the parent
company (English) Cape.100 The plaintiff argued that he was injured
due to the negligent and unsafe practices in which asbestos and
asbestos produces were manufactured.101 The Ali Enterprises case
illustrates the second category. Here the links were contractual; fire
victims sued KiK, a German clothing retail company that was the
sole buyer of all garments produced at the Ali Enterprises Factory.
When the foreign and local firms are linked through relations of
corporate ownership, the primary hurdle for establishing the
liability of the parent company is the doctrine of separate corporate
personality.102 Most common law jurisdictions provide an exception
to this rule under the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil.” 103
However, this doctrine allows the courts to impose liability on the
parent company only in limited circumstances, which typically do
not include cases in which the subsidiary company has caused harm
complicity to the responsibility of multinational corporations); Brent Burmester,
Snejina Michailova & Christina Stringer, Modern Slavery and International Business
Scholarship: The Governance Nexus, 15 CRITICAL PERSPS. ON INT’L. BUS. 139 (2019)
(noting the responsibility of multinational corporations for rights violations in the
value chain); Oliver Balch, Mars, Nestlé and Hershey to face child slavery lawsuit in US,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2021, 17:31 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2021/feb/12/mars-nestle-and-hershey-to-face-landmark-childslavery-lawsuit-in-us [https://perma.cc/QBL2-5HQ8] (describing recent class
action filed by former workers of cocoa beans farms in Côte d’Ivoire, in which the
workers argue that they were subject to forced labor and child slavery while
cultivating cocoa beans on the farms, which supply cocoa beans to the defendants).
99
Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [1], [2012] 1 WLR 3111 [1]
(Eng.).
100
Id.
101
Id. ¶ 3 (“Asbestos was produced on the same site in a factory with open
sides, and dust from that factory migrated into the area where Mr Chandler
worked. Cape in effect accepts that Cape Products failed in its duty to Mr
Chandler.”).
102
See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Personality in American Law: A
Summary Review, 38 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 49, 49 (1990) (describing the history of the
corporate personality doctrine and its current use).
103
See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991) (describing the legal possibility of piercing the
corporate veil, and offering an empirical assessment of the doctrine).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss3/2

2022]

Tort as Meta-Regulation

691

to its employees or third parties as part of its business activity.104
The broader principle, which characterizes both English and
American law, is that the corporate veil may be pierced only to
prevent the abuse of corporate legal personality.105
In view of the limitations imposed by company law, plaintiffs
have used basic tort law principles to establish the responsibility of
the parent company, arguing that it (and potentially its directors)
owes a direct duty of care to the victims of the subsidiary’s negligent
behavior. Thus, for example, in Chandler v. Cape, 106 the English
Court of Appeal has stated that the law may impose on a parent
company responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s
employees only in the following circumstances (which are also
applicable to cases involving damage to third parties):
(1) the businesses of the parent and subsidiary are in a
relevant respect the same; (2) the parent has, or ought to
have, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect of health
and safety in the particular industry; (3) the subsidiary’s
system of work is unsafe as the parent company knew, or
ought to have known; and (4) the parent knew or ought to
have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees would
rely on its using that superior knowledge for the employees’
protection.107
104
See Tan Cheng-Han, Jiangyu Wang & Christian Hofmann, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: Historical, Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, 16 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 140, 150-57 (2019) (discussing how different jurisdictions allow piercing in
limited circumstances).
105
Id. at 153; Prest v. Petrodel Res. Ltd., [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 3 WLR 1 at 23 (Eng.) (affirming the holding to refuse piercing the corporate veil without an
abuse of corporate personality); Glazer v. Comm’m on Ethics for Pub. Emps., 431
So. 2d 752, 757 (La. 1983) (“It is not unusual for a court in this country to disregard
. . . “pierc[ing] the corporate veil,” . . . . A court might pierce the corporate veil when
the established norm of corporateness has been so abused in conducting a business
. . . .”) (citation omitted).
106
Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80] (Eng.).
107

For the purposes of (4) it is not necessary to show that the parent is in the
practice of intervening in the health and safety policies of the subsidiary.
The court will look at the relationship between the companies more
widely. The court may find that element (4) is established where the
evidence shows that the parent has a practice of intervening in the trading
operations of the subsidiary, for example production and funding issues.
Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80] (Eng.). For a similar ruling by
English court, see Lungowe v. Vedanta Res. PLC [2017] EWCA Civ 1528 [83] (Eng.)
(accepting the Chandler’s test for finding a parent company responsible).
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In the Chandler case, the court found that the four conditions
have been met.108 It should be emphasized that the ruling was also
based on the finding that the parent company exercised significant
level of control over the operation of its subsidiaries.109
However, these conditions represent a relatively unique parentsubsidiary business dynamic, which is not common. The Chandler
doctrine does not apply to cases in which the relations between the
parties are purely contractual,110 for example, where manufacturing
firms in developing countries sell their goods to buyer-firms in the
West, but are not owned by them. For instance, in the Ali
Enterprises case, workers argued that KiK, as the sole buyer of all
garments produced at the Ali Enterprises Factory, was responsible
for the factory and for their injuries. The first route the victims can
take to support their claim is based on contract law. The claim in
this case would be that the agreement between KiK and Ali
Enterprises grants enforceable rights to the workforce of Ali
Enterprises as third-party beneficiaries. This argument is based on
the content of KiK’s code of conduct, which sets out detailed fire and
workplace safety regulations as well as monitoring and auditing
procedures.111 The doctrine that a contract may grant third-party
beneficiary enforceable rights against the promisor, even if the thirdparty is not part of the actual agreement, can be found in both civil
law and common law jurisdictions.112
However, this contractual argument faces various difficulties,
and in most cases, it will not provide a viable strategy for victims.
First, most jurisdictions require that the contract will include an
explicit statement providing that the third party may enforce a term

Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [73] (Eng.).
Id.; see also Vedanta Resources PLC v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20 [55] (Eng.)
(emphasizing the issue of effective control, in a claim brought by 1,826 Zambian
villagers against UK based Vedanta and its Zambian subsidiary KCM).
110
See Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [73] (Eng.).
111
See Reinke & Zumbansen, supra note 48, at 15 (arguing detailing “fire and
workplace safety regulations as well as monitoring and auditing procedures” in
code of conduct is granting enforceable rights as a third-party beneficiary).
112
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §304 (Am. L. Inst. 1981); Contracts
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (Eng.); Neil Andrews, Strangers to Justice No
Longer: The Reversal of the Privity Rule Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act
1999, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 353, 354 (2001); Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the
Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1985).
108
109
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of the contract.113 It would be far-reaching, for example, to infer such
an intention from a firm’s code of conduct by itself, if the supplying
contract between the parties does not explicitly incorporate it into
the contract. 114 Indeed, in Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in which
employees of foreign companies that sell goods to Wal-Mart Stores
brought claims against Wal-Mart based on the working conditions
in each of their factories, the court rejected the plaintiffs third-party
beneficiary theory.115 The court noted that “Plaintiffs’ allegations
are insufficient to support the conclusion that Wal-Mart and the
suppliers intended for Plaintiffs to have a right of performance
against Wal-Mart under the supply contracts.” 116 Second, the
purchasing company can easily protect itself from such claims by
adding a provision that expressly excludes any capacity of thirdparties to sue under the contract.
Another option is to base the claim on tort principles, drawing
on the doctrinal structure which was set out in Chandler. In the
relationship between KiK and Ali Enterprises, one can convincingly
argue that the first two conditions of Chandler have been satisfied:
the two companies were in the same business (textile) and the
purchasing company (KiK) had superior knowledge on some
relevant aspect of health and safety in the textile industry. The next
two conditions are more difficult to satisfy. The third condition
requires the victims to prove that KiK ought to have known that the
manufacturing conditions in Ali Enterprises are unsafe. While KiK
could have reasonably assumed that the health and safety
conditions in Ali Enterprises are not on par with those that exist in
similar German firms, it is not obvious that it had actual and
concrete knowledge of such risks or an obligation (and ability) to
collect data regarding their existence. The fourth criterion is even
more problematic; it states that the purchasing company ought to
have foreseen that the employees of the manufacturing company
113

(UK):

See, for example, Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c.31, § 1(1)

Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person who is not a party to a
contract (a “third party”) may in his own right enforce a term of the
contract if—(a) the contract expressly provides that he may, or (b) subject
to subsection (2), the term purports to confer a benefit on him.
114
See Jan M. Smits, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes under Private
Law: On the Disciplining Power of Legal Doctrine, 24 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 99, 11011 (2017) (explaining how incorporating the code into the contract creates a
contractual liability).
115
Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 678 (9th Cir. 2009).
116
Id. at 682.
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would rely on KiK using its superior knowledge to protect them.
Implicitly, this condition also assumes that the contracting party
would have some level of control over the behavior of the
manufacturing party. In usual commercial relations, the last two
conditions would rarely materialize. From an economic perspective,
the purchaser would usually not be in a position to efficiently reduce
the risks of health and safety accidents within the premises of the
manufacturer (relative to other entities).
What may change this presumption are situations, such as those
existing in the Ali Enterprises scenario, where the purchaser and
manufacturing company are engaged in a long-term business
relation and where the purchaser has explicitly undertaken certain
commitments regarding the health and safety conditions within the
manufacturer in its code of conduct. Still, even in such scenario,
imposing tort liability could be interpreted as an unreasonable
intervention in the contractual framework that governs the
commercial relations between the parties, turning the purchasing
company to a kind of mega-insurer of all the risks associated with
the value-chain. Indeed, courts have been reluctant to accept such
claims.
The Canadian case of Das v. George Weston Limited 117 nicely
illustrates this dilemma. We consider the case in some detail
because it is paradigmatic of the contractual structures underlying
many transnational value-chain interactions. Loblaws, Canada’s
largest retailer, has purchased clothes from a manufacturer whose
factory was located in the Rana Plaza building in Savar, Bangladesh.
On April 24, 2013, the Rana Plaza collapsed. 1,129 people died, and
2,520 people were seriously injured. On April 22, 2015, just before
the second anniversary of the tragedy, four Bangladeshi citizens
filed a class action lawsuit in Ontario against Loblaws and against
Bureau Veritas,118 which was retained by Loblaws to conduct audits
in manufacturing sites.
The further details of the contractual structure of this case are
important for the analysis:
Loblaws retained Pearl Global to produce articles for the Joe
Fresh line of clothing. Pearl Global, in turn, out-sourced
some of the work to New Wave, which was operating two
117
See Das v. George Weston Ltd., [2017] ONSC 4129, ¶ 5 (Can.) (dismissing
actions of the plaintiffs (Das and others); Das v. George Weston Ltd.d, [2018] ONCA
1053, ¶¶ 4-5 (Can.) (affirming the dismissal from the lower court).
118 Das, [2017] ONSC 4129, ¶ 1.
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factories on several floors of the Rana Plaza in Savar,
Bangladesh. Loblaws does not own or manage Rana Plaza. .
. . [49] The Vendor Buyer Agreement between Loblaws and
Pearl Global, dated February 23, 2009 designates New Wave
Style as a supplier for Loblaws. Only Loblaws and Pearl
Global are parties to the Vendor Buyer Agreement. The
Vendor Buyer Agreement incorporated Loblaws’ Supplier
Agreement, which includes a Supplier Code of Conduct,
which was derived from Loblaws’ CSR standards. . . . [49]
The Vendor Buyer Agreement and CSR standards permitted
Loblaws to perform site inspections of its suppliers’ factories,
but did not require Loblaws to do so. The Vendor Buyer
Agreement and the CSR standards permitted Loblaws to end
their business relationship with Pearl Global if it failed to
comply with the CSR standards. However, Loblaws had no
contractual right to control the supplier’s operations or to
order a supplier or sub-supplier to shut down. . . . [52] . . .
[To ensure compliance with Loblaws’ CSR standards,]
Loblaws [also] engaged Bureau Veritas’ Bangladesh
subsidiary . . . to conduct “social audits.” [55] Loblaws’s
retainer of Bureau Veritas was a limited retainer for a basic
social audit.119
The retainer did not include safety risk assessment and building
construction and structural integrity assessment. These safety audits
required special expertise and were thus more expansive.120
The following figure describes the contractual structure
underlying the case.

Id. ¶¶ 43-55.
Id. ¶ 54. Under the Agreement between Loblaws and Bureau Veritas,
Bureau Veritas was not required to investigate and report on the structural integrity
of the premises in which it was conducting a social audit. Id. ¶ 57. An employee of
Bureau Veritas in his deposition stated that the retainer was for auditing
“occupational health and safety issues and employment practices, such as forced
labor, child labor, wages and benefits, hours of work, harassment, and workers’
rights” and not for “inspect[ing] the building’s structural integrity.” Id. ¶ 63. Social
auditors, he said, “are not trained engineers and do not investigate the structural
integrity of buildings.” Id. Bureau Veritas conducted two audits of New Wave
premises in which it identified several health and safety problems such as
machinery safety and use, clean drinking water, fire alarm systems and emergency
lighting and exits. Id. ¶ 66. Neither Loblaws nor Bureau Veritas followed up on
these deficiencies. Id. ¶ 68. Bureau Veritas argues that “it had no ability to schedule
a follow-up audit because scheduling was within the sole discretion of Loblaws.”
Id.
119

120
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Figure 1: Contractual Structure—Das v. George Weston Limited

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that the plaintiffs
“have no legally viable tort claims or breach of fiduciary duty claims
against either Defendant, and, therefore, the Plaintiffs’ action should
be dismissed” under either the law of the law of Ontario or the law
of Bangladesh.121 The court provided several reasons for its ruling.
As we will see below, the ruling also provides some tentative
support for the idea of PTR liability.
First, the court distinguishes this case from Chandler, by
emphasizing Loblaws’ lack of control over New Wave. The duty to
the subsidiary’s employees, that was recognized in Chandler v. Caple
plc, the court noted, “arose where the subsidiary was, practically
speaking, a division of the parent company and the parent company
had extensive knowledge of the dangerous working conditions and
what to do about them.”122 The court further emphasized that New
Wave was not Loblaws’ subsidiary: “rather, it was a sub-supplier to
one of Loblaws’ subsidiaries and Loblaws had no direct control over
New Wave and only limited indirect control over New Wave
through its CSR standards and no control over the workplace and
over the employees working there.”123 This point was reiterated by
the Court of Appeal:

121
122
123

Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 433.
Id. ¶ 435.
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Loblaws was not directly involved in the management of
New Wave or in the process of manufacturing the products.
Loblaws did not have control over where the manufacturing
operation took place. Loblaws’ only means of controlling
New Wave was through cancellation of its product orders
from Pearl Global for non-compliance with the CSR
Standards. Nor is there any pleaded history of Loblaws
using that lever to enforce any change in New Wave’s
operations.124
The position of the Court of Justice regarding the auditing
company Bureau Veritas was more nuanced, and is of special
interest in the context of our inquiry into the liability of private
regulatory bodies. The court seems to be more open to the
possibility that Bureau Veritas owed a duty of care to the employees
of New Wave, which could have led to it becoming liable to their
tort claims. However, Bureau Veritas was only retained to conduct
“social audits,” and the risk of the Rana Plaza structural collapse was
thus outside Bureau Veritas contractual responsibilities. Therefore,
the Court accepted the auditor’s argument, and maintained it cannot
be responsible for any damage associated with the collapse:
If it had negligently performed some service within the
ambit of its social audit and a New Wave Style employee was
injured as a result, then Bureau Veritas would be exposed to
liability. However, Bureau Veritas says it could not be
negligent for failing to address matters associated with the
structural integrity of Rana Plaza, which was outside its
contractual responsibilities.125

Das, [2018] ONCA 1053, ¶ 180.
Das, [2017] ONSC 4129 ¶ 444. The court provides a useful analogy:
A public health inspector inspects a restaurant and fails to warn that the
equipment in the restaurant is contaminated by bacteria. The public
health inspector also fails to warn about a possible structural defect in a
barring wall of the restaurant. A few days later, the restaurant’s premises
collapses and the patrons who happened to be in the restaurant are
injured. The patrons sue the public health inspector and allege that the
public health inspector owed them a duty of care. This allegation of a
duty of care would be true insofar as any patrons suffered from food
poisoning but not insofar as the patrons suffered injuries from the
collapse of the restaurant’s premises.
Id. ¶ 443; see also ¶ 551 (restating this idea in the context of Canadian law). The
Court of Appeal confirmed this point. Das, [2018] ONCA 1053, ¶¶ 181, 200.
124

125
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The plaintiffs in Das v. George Weston Limited have put forward
several general policy considerations, which they argue support the
imposition of liability on MNEs such as Loblaws:
(a) accountability by Canadian corporations who enjoy
substantial profits from holding themselves out as
responsible corporate citizens; (b) preventing Canadian
corporations from exploiting the regulatory vacuum in
developing countries, particularly when doing so places
vulnerable workers at risk of death or grave bodily harm,
and (c) advancing the common law duty of care in a manner
that reflects the globalized economy in which Canadian
entities participate.126
While the court was sympathetic to these arguments, 127 it
decided that stronger counter-policy arguments overpowered
them. First, it noted that imposing liability on Loblaws and other
similar MNEs may deter them from doing business with
manufacturers in developing countries. 128 Second, if developing
CSR policies exposes companies to transnational liability, this could
deter them from developing and promulgating such standards, and
from trading with developing countries with weak regulatory
frameworks.129 The court therefore concluded that:
[T]he imposition of liability is unfair given that the
Defendants [Loblaws and Bureau Veritas] are not
responsible for the vulnerability of the plaintiffs, did not
create the dangerous workplace, had no control over the
circumstances that were dangerous, and had no control over
126
127
128

Das, [2017] ONSC 4129, para. 451.
Id.
Id. ¶ 455.

129

Loblaws’ liability is based on it voluntarily assuming a duty of care by
developing and promulgating ethical purchasing practices (CSR
standards,) which one would like to think is a good thing, but from an
exposure to liability perspective, Loblaws would have been far better off
if it had not developed and promulgated its CSR standards, and in the
future it and others would be far better off not doing business with
Bangladesh rather than relying on CSR standards, which as
demonstrated by the case at bar, do not insulate a business from liability
but rather attract claims, including allegations that the duty of care was
breached because the CSR standards were inadequate to protect a
supplier’s or sub-supplier’s employees.
Id. ¶ 456.
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the employers or employees or other occupants of Rana
Plaza.”130
While the Court of Appeal confirmed the lower court ruling to
dismiss the claim, it revised its ruling regarding the costs. It noted
that the motion judge failed to appreciate the public interest
component in the claim advanced by the appellants and therefore
reduced the costs awarded by thirty percent. 131 The court (Judge
Doherty) has made the following important comments in this
context:132
[259] In a very real sense, the tragedy at Rana Plaza reveals
the true cost associated with the production of inexpensive
goods for consumers in affluent countries. The ready-wear
garment industry in Bangladesh pays very low wages, and
tolerates unsafe and unhealthy working conditions. The low
wages and abysmal working conditions are the product, in
part, of the very low prices paid for the products made by
those workers. Purchasers like Loblaws are able to keep the
prices paid for the products low under the implied threat of
taking their business to a manufacturer in another
developing country . . . [262] The claim advanced by the
appellants lays bare important public policy questions going
to the role Canada and, more specifically, its business
community, play and should aspire to play in the global
marketplace. Do Canada and Canadian business entities
have any social, moral, or legal obligations to workers in
developing countries whose labour contributes to the
economic well-being of Canadian businesses and
consumers? If so, what are those obligations? These difficult
issues go well beyond the immediate interests of the parties
to this lawsuit, and raise important matters of public interest.
In Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court has rejected the
plaintiffs’ negligence claims for similar reasons.133
130
Id. ¶ 457. The foregoing analysis relates to Bangladesh law. The court
reaches the same conclusion under Ontario law, similarly emphasizing the issue of
Loblaws lack of over the actions of its foreign sub-supplier. Id. ¶ 540.
131
Das, [2018] ONCA 1053, ¶ 225.
132
Id. ¶¶ 259, 262.
133
See Doe I, 572 F.3d at 684 (emphasizing Wal-Mart’s lack of control over the
day-to-day work of plaintiffs in the supplier’ foreign factories and the fact that WalMart did not undertake any obligation to protect the plaintiffs, but “merely
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Overall, while courts in the West may be sympathetic to the
claims brought by victims down the supply chain, the barriers for
succeeding in such claims remain high.
III.

PRIVATE-PUBLIC HYBRIDS: THE LIMITATIONS OF PRIVATE
REGULATORS

Following the globalization of manufacturing, both activists and
scholars have called for increased responsibility of retailers in
developed countries to working conditions in developing
countries. 134 This Part reviews the development of private
transnational regulatory regimes, as a response to these calls and to
the global governance deficit described in Part II. We discuss the
problems that can undermine the efficacy of this form of private
global regulation. This discussion is used as background to our
proposal detailed in Part IV.
PTRs are private transnational entities that offer semi-regulatory
services. PTRs perform both a “legislative” function, setting
standards of behavior, and a “policing” function, enforcing these
standards. PTRs are part of an institutional complex that includes
the relevant legal texts, the body (or bodies) responsible for
administering the texts and the individual agents closely associated
with these bodies. This institutional complex may encompass more
than one organization (e.g., when the compliance functionality is not
provided by the body responsible for developing the norms).
Private firms actively seek the endorsement of PTRs (through
certification or membership) in order to signal their high social and
environmental performance to consumers and to earn a civic license
to operate in the markets of developed countries.135
reserved the right to cancel its supply contracts if inspections revealed contractual
breaches by the suppliers”).
134
See Angela Hale & Jane Wills, Women Working Worldwide: Transnational
Networks, Corporate Social Responsibility and Action Research, 7 GLOB. NETWORKS 453,
463-66 (2007) (describing the efforts targeting companies to raise awareness and
motivate them to take responsibilities); Jennifer Hurley & Doug Miller, The
Changing Face of the Global Garment Industry, in THREADS OF LABOUR: GARMENT
INDUSTRY SUPPLY CHAINS FROM THE WORKERS’ PERSPECTIVE 16 (Angela Hale & Jane
Wills eds., 2005) (providing the structural context of the global garment industry).
135
See Sandra Waddock, Building a New Institutional Infrastructure for Corporate
Responsibility, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPS. 87, 89 (2008) (arguing that corporate
responsibility standards such as SA 8000 are part of a new institutional
infrastructure and are being increasingly adopted by corporations).
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PTRs provide an additional layer of regulation that operates
alongside the global public law (e.g., ILO and environmental
conventions) and domestic law (national environmental, health and
safety and workers’ rights regulations). We argue that the system of
PTRs constitutes a complex network which establishes, through the
condensation of links between multiple PTRs, a new type of
transnational authority, which is independent of the regulatory
apparatus of either state or treaty law. As we argue below, the
‘network’ feature of PTRs has various theoretical and pragmatic
implications.
PTRs represent a novel mode of voluntary “self-governance.”136
PTRs are generated jointly by firms, non-government bodies, and
international treaty organizations (such as ILO and UNEP).
Advocates argue that PTRs are necessary to improve workplace
conditions, especially in jurisdictions that lack robust enforcement
of regulatory standards.137 PTRs are voluntary and are usually not
accompanied with formal legal sanctions; 138 advocates argue they
are nevertheless effective because PTRs utilize a combination of soft
regulatory instruments and sanctions, and market mechanisms. 139
In particular, the advocates focus on firms’ reputational
motivations: firms have an incentive to qualify for private
certification in order to appeal to consumers, signal that the firm
abides by accepted standards of social responsibility, and thereby
increase income and market access to developed markets.140 Once
certification is obtained, firms have an incentive to comply with the
code of conduct in order to maintain the certification; presumably,
losing the certification after it is obtained is harmful to the firm’s
reputation and to its market opportunities.141
Critics of PTRs have voiced concerns regarding the capacity of
PTRs to effectuate real change in the behavior of manufacturers in
136
They are self-governance because they are initiatives that voluntarily
emerged. See Gilbert et al., supra note 32, at 23-24 (“We label this diverse set of
[PTRs] ‘international accountability standards’ and define them as voluntary
predefined rules, procedures, and methods . . . .”).
137
Göbbels & Jonker, supra note 32.
138
See Gilbert et al., supra note 32, at 24 (noting that PTRs “are not enforceable
through legally binding regulations).
139
See Gilbert et al., supra note 32, at 24 (discussing three reasons that can make
PTRs less voluntary).
140
See Gilbert et al., supra note 32, at 24 (discussing the pressures on
companies to adopt standards).
141
See Gilbert et al., supra note 32, at 27-28 (explaining Certification
Standards).
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developing countries. The Ali Enterprise disaster which occurred
despite the fact that the factory gained SA8000 certification just
weeks before the accident, illustrates this problem. 142 The Ali
Express Factory received its SA8000 safety certification in August
2012, 143 and was burned down on September 11 the same year.
RINA Services S.p.A., an Italian company headquartered in Genoa,
issued the factory’s certificate.144 RINA functioned as a compliance
agent that provides inspection, assessment, and certification
services.145 The Ali Express certification followed an inspection by
RI&CA, a RINA subcontractor in Karachi. Investigations conducted
after the fire showed that hundreds of lives could have been saved
if lax safety standards in the factory had been identified and acted
upon in time.146 Research suggests that the Ali Enterprise case may
reflect a more systematic problem regarding the capacity of PTRs to
improve working conditions in developing countries.147
Several interrelated problems may contribute to the failure of
PTRs to act as alternate regulators. First, PTRs operate only as
complementary regulators. They do not possess the formal powers
of either national regulators or international public law
organizations. Thus, even if a PTR acts optimally, its efforts could
be completely countered by the national regulator’s approach to
regulatory breaches. The repertoire of regulatory responses that a
PTR can use are much more limited than those of national
regulators. They consist primarily of various informational actions
(notifying the purchasing company of any breaches, issue warnings
regarding safety problems) and the revocation of certification.
Second, because of the close association of PTRs and the business
community, PTRs may be subject to rent-seeking pressures from
142
Terwindt et al., supra note 15, at 271; EUR. CTR. FOR CONST. & HUM. RTS.,
CASE REPORT: RINA CERTIFIES SAFETY BEFORE FACTORY FIRE IN PAKISTAN 1 (2020),
https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Fallbeschreibungen/CaseReport_KiK_RINA_
December2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/FYY9-25KL].
143
EUR. CTR. FOR CONST. & HUM. RTS., supra note 143, at 1.
144
EUR. CTR. FOR CONST. & HUM. RTS., supra note 143, at 1.
145
EUR. CTR. FOR CONST. & HUM. RTS., supra note 143, at 1.
146
EUR. CTR. FOR CONST. & HUM. RTS., supra note 143, at 2.
147
See Locke et al., supra note 36, at 34 (noting in its case study wide variations
in compliance and working conditions even after implementing a PTR); M ARTJE
THEUWS, MARIETTE VAN HUIJSTEE, PAULINE OVEREEM, JOS VAN SETERS & TESSEL PAULI,
FATAL FASHION 13-15 (SOMO & CCC eds., 2013) (pointing out flaws of PTRs); HUM.
RTS. WATCH, supra note 46; Richard Locke, Ben A. Rissing & Timea Pal, Complements
or Substitutes? Private Codes, State Regulation and the Enforcement of Labour Standards
in Global Supply Chains, 51 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELS. 519, 543 (2013) (concluding that
effects of PTRs vary across regimes).
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corporate players. 148 PTRs are subject to an inherent conflict of
interests, since their enforcement and auditing services are typically
paid by the factory or company supposedly being supervised, or by
the transnational buyer.149 The influence of corporate players may
prevent PTRs from setting high-enough standards. Critics of PTRs
argue that the current system is not truly designed to improve safety
and working conditions, but simply to legitimize production in
developing countries in the eyes of consumers and maintain the
oppressive arrangements of globalized manufacturing.150
Third, while the problem of regulatory capture is present also at
the domestic level, it is more severe in the case of PTRs because of
the lack of sufficiently robust supervisory mechanisms similar to the
ones that can be found at the national level. There is no global, metaregulatory framework that scrutinizes the operations of PTRs. PTRs
are neither subject to the checks-and-balances of the democratic
process, with its embedded threat of re-election, nor are they subject
to the control of a regulatory czar like the U.S. Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).151 There are some parallel private
meta regulatory mechanisms such as ISEAL, the global membership
association for credible sustainability standards.
ISEAL’s
Credibility Principles require standard-setters to engage with a
balanced and representative group of stakeholders in development
of standards152, and its Assurance Code requires scheme owners to
148
See, e.g., Abdurafiu Olaiya Noah, Pawan Adhikari, Babafemi O. Ogundele
& Hassan Yazdifar, Corporate Environmental Accountability in Nigeria: An Example of
Regulatory Failure and Regulatory Capture, 11 J. ACCT. EMERGING ECONS. 70, 84 (2020)
(finding that corporations have captured the regulations in Nigeria); José Carlos
Marques, Private Regulatory Capture via Harmonization: An Analysis of Global Retailer
Regulatory Intermediaries, 13 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 157, 157-60, 170-72 (2019)
(introducing a regulatory capture model and analyzing why it is in the interests of
the corporations to capture regulators); David Monciardini & Guido Conaldi, The
European Regulation of Corporate Social Responsibility: The Role of Beneficiaries’
Intermediaries, 13 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 240, 241, 250-51 (2019) (finding a close
relationship among NGOs, investors, and unions playing a role in developing and
adopting regulations).
149
Locke et al., supra note 36, at 23.
150
See Locke et al., supra note 3636, at 22-23 (“[Codes] are designed not to
protect labour rights or improve working conditions but instead to limit the legal
liability of global brands and prevent damage to their reputation.”).
151
See Stuart Shapiro, OIRA Inside and Out, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 137-38
(2011) (explaining the use of the term “Regulatory Czar” in the context of OIRA, a
United States federal government office located within the Office of Management
and Budget, which is a division of the Executive Office of the President).
152
ISEAL,
ISEAL
CREDIBILITY
PRINCIPLES:
VERSION
2
(2021),
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establish a complaint resolution procedure with power to
investigate and take appropriate action regarding relevant
complaints.153 However, ISEAL does not possess the same powers
as OIRA.
There are also good reasons to be skeptical of consumers’ ability
to act as efficient watchdogs of PTRs’ behavior. On the one hand,
PTRs respond to the demands of consumers and the public in
developed countries, pressuring to set higher and more demanding
standards. On the other hand, PTRs, as noted above, are also subject
to pressure by firms and manufacturers, in both developed and
developing countries, to offer lenient standards and lax compliance.
There is ample reason to believe that pressure from firms is more
effective compared to pressure from consumers. Consumers are
rarely aware of the precise details of the standards; typically, they
will only be aware of the fact the manufacturer abides by some
standard and may have a general idea of its content. Manufacturers,
in contrast, have detailed knowledge of the content of the code, and
can negotiate with standard-setters for specific modifications.
Furthermore, consumers in the West are dispersed and their gains
from pressuring Western firms are rather low. In contrast, firms
have much stronger incentives to lobby standard-setters directly or
through the political system in order to affect their costs of
complying with the standard.
In some cases, the presence of the private regulator may not only
be unhelpful but actually harmful. 154 Thus, if the standard-setter
sets a suboptimal standard, and the firm can show that it had
complied with such standard, the firm may secure legal immunity
although it did not exercise due care. In this sense, the intervention
of a PTR can create a new problem, by allowing the firm to escape
liability. Another problem is that the presence of PTRs may provide
states with an excuse to forgo their own enforcement efforts.155 Since
PTRs provide regulatory services with no public funding, are selfhttps://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/resource/2021-06/ISEALCredibility-Principles-V2-2021_EN_ISEAL_June-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU4ZMKWL].
153
ISEAL ALLIANCE, ASSURING COMPLIANCE WITH SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS:
ISEAL
CODE
OF
GOOD
PRACTICE
18
(2018),
https://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/resource/201802/ISEAL_Assurance_Code_Version_2.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z23Z-VNQL].
154
See Rasche, supra note 45, at 280 (noting “problematic” sides of PTRs).
155
See Rasche, supra note 45, at 283 (noting how corporate responsibility
standards act in areas where hard laws should be acting).
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governed, and report their activities, governments can use them to
justify a decrease in state-based enforcement efforts. The concern is,
therefore, that PTRs may represent a whitewashing effort: they
provide legitimacy to firms, but it is unclear whether this legitimacy
is backed by a real improvement in regulatory standards. This is an
accountability problem; it is hard to point out any effective
mechanism pressuring PTRs to set high standards and enforce them
rigorously.
IV.

A PROPOSAL: TORT LIABILITY OF PRIVATE REGULATORS

This Part details our proposal, to hold PTRs liable in tort for
harms caused by suboptimal regulatory standards or compliance
activity. We argue that this type of responsibility could contribute
to the structuring of a more effective global regulatory CSR network.
The literature that examined the governance of risks across
transnational value chains has focused on the responsibility and
potential liability of MNEs, and has mostly ignored the potential
liability of PTRs. 156 We argue that this represents a significant
lacuna in the literature. We show that our thesis has solid ground
in tort case law in the United States and in Canada, and that our
proposal can contribute to the emergence of more efficient and
accountable transnational regulatory networks.
PTRs do not often cause harms directly; they do, however, cause
indirect harms by setting suboptimal standards or by failing to fully
enforce the standards they create. We propose holding private
regulators liable in tort for such harms in order to incentivize them
to invest appropriately in preventing harms. Our proposal targets
then both the standard-setting organizations and their compliance
agents, which in most cases constitute separate entities. Standardsetting organizations include, for example, Social Accountability
International (SAI) that established the SA8000 standard and
Fairtrade International that is responsible for a series of Fairtrade
standards. 157 In the case of SA8000, compliance assurance is
156
For literatures focusing on the responsibility and potential liability of
MNEs, see sources cited supra note 48.
157
SA8000
Standard,
SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L,
https://saintl.org/programs/sa8000/ [https://perma.cc/C2R7-NTE6] (last visited Jan. 22,
2022);
Aims
of
the
Fairtrade
Standards,
FAIRTRADE
INT’L,
https://www.fairtrade.net/standard/aims [https://perma.cc/G2W8-6GU8] (last
visited Jan. 22, 2022).
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provided through Social Accountability Accreditation Services
(SAAS), which accredits certification bodies, authorizing them to
audit and issue SA8000 certificates. 158 In the case of Fairtrade
International, the certification of producers and traders for
compliance with Fairtrade Standards is delivered by FLOCERT. 159
We argue that imposing liability on such organizations could lead
PTRs to set and enforce more appropriate standards, and to
strengthen their ties with public international organizations and
other PTRs in a way that will improve the overall efficacy of the
regulation of transnational value chains.
a. Liability Regimes
We suggest that private regulators be held liable under a
negligence regime.160 That is, a private regulator will be liable if it
can be shown that it failed to exercise due care in setting the
standard or in enforcing it. In the case that these functions are
undertaken by different entities, the nature of the duty of care will
be revised accordingly. To illustrate what would constitute such
negligent behavior in practice, consider again the details of the Ali
Enterprises Factory fire.
Reports following the Ali Enterprises disaster indicated the
following causes that ultimately led to the tragic consequences: “the
lack of emergency exits while the few available exits were locked . .
. absence of fire alarms . . . not enough fire extinguishers and those
that were there were not in working order . . . [and] there was no
general fire safety training at the factory.”161 Further analysis of the
conduct of all the private regulators associated with this case, SAI,
SAAS and RINA Services S.p.A (an Italian company that provided
the Ali Enterprises Factory with the SA8000 certification) provides
indications of negligence at both the standard-setting and
compliance stages.
SA8000 Standard, supra note 157.
FLOCERT, https://www.flocert.net/ [https://perma.cc/YJ2L-HLM3]
(last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
160
See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972)
(explaining the details of the negligence regime and pointing out its efficiency); see
also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort
Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 883-916 (1981) (applying economic models to evaluating the
efficiency of negligence regime).
161
Terwindt, et al., supra note 15Error! Bookmark not defined., at 272.
158
159
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A Complaint submitted by the Ali Enterprises Factory Fire
Affectees Association (AEFFAA) against RINA Services to the
Italian OECD National Contact Point demonstrates the negligent
behavior of the auditing company. 162 The audit report issued by
RINA Service before the disaster 163 found the health and safety
requirements to be satisfactory, and that the Ali Enterprises facility
complied with the SA8000 standard. The audit report failed to
indicate the various safety problems found on the site, including the
lack of access to exit-routes, the lack of sufficient emergency-exits,
the lack of sufficient fire extinguishers and the lack of sufficient fire
safety training. Worse, the auditing report has actually reported that
all these conditions had been met, falsely representing the actual
situation in the factory.164
A report prepared by SAI after the disaster provides indication
of potential negligence by SAI and SAAS, both in the standardsetting process and in the governance of the certification agencies.165
The report noted that “SAI has developed and issued a fire safety
checklist for SA8000 auditor use.”166 The checklist provides many
more details compared to the general and abstract provisions
regarding health and safety included in the original SA8000
162
Ali Enters. Factory Fire Affectees Assoc. v. RINA Servs. S.p.A., Italian OECD
Nat’l
Contact
Point,
Complaint,
at
8-13
(Sept.
11,
2008),
https://www.oecdwatch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/8/dlm_uploads/2021/03/11.09.2018%20OECD%20Comp
laint%20v%20RINA.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5ZF-LVXS]. The responsibility of
RINA for the accident was recognized by the Italian OECD National Contact Point
(NCP). Italian Nat’l Contact Point, Initial Assessment, ¶ 103 (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://pcnitalia.mise.gov.it/attachments/article/2035928/Case%20AEFFAA%2
0v.%20RINA%20-%20Initial%20Assessment%20DEF%20(5).pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YKY-WK3M] (finding inconsistencies in audit reports
approved by RINA regarding factory conditions). Unlike national courts, NCPs do
not have the authority to make liability determinations and their primary function
is to promote a shared resolution of issues related to the implementation of the
OECD Guidelines.
163
RINA has been accredited to carry out SA8000 certification by SAAS since
2001. For the audit of the Ali Enterprises factory, RINA has engaged a
subcontractor from Pakistan, RI&CA, Regional Inspection & Certification Agency.
Ali Enters. Factory Fire Affectees Assoc., Italian OECD Nat’l Contact Point, Complaint,
at 5.
164
Ali Enters. Factory Fire Affectees Assoc., Italian OECD Nat’l Contact Point,
Complaint, at 10.
165
See SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, REPORT ADDENDUM: FIRE SAFETY IN
PAKISTAN AND WORLDWIDE (n.d.) (a copy is available from the authors).
166
Id. at 23.
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standard that was also revised in 2013.167 The checklist responds to
many of the problems that were identified as contributing causes to
the fatal fire in the Ali Enterprises Factory and requires “a formal
training program through which new and existing workers are
periodically trained on fire-related issues,” “escape routes and fire
doors free from obstruction,” “functioning fire alarm system that
has been recently tested” and that “fire doors have push bars to open
the door manually.”168 The proper articulation and specification of
general standards is part of an optimal rule-making process.169 The
fact such details were only required in the updated SAI checklist
indicates the inadequacy of the original standard. A further
problem that was indicated in the report concerned the oversight of
the SA8000 audit system by SAAS.170 The report outlines several
aspects in which SAAS has failed to optimally supervise the
auditing agencies, 171 and details steps to improve the quality and
credibility of the auditing process. Such steps include increased
frequency of unannounced SA8000 audits in ‘high risk’ countries,
improved auditor competency and training, preparation of fire
safety webinar required of all SA8000 auditors, and minimization of
the risk of corruption by requiring rotation of SA8000 auditors to
reduce conflicts of interest.172
As we showed above, PTRs may be negligent in various aspects
of their behavior: the standard-setting process, the compliance
assurance of a concrete firm, and the oversight of compliance agents

167
See SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, SAI FIRE SAFETY CHECKLIST (2013),
https://sa-intl.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/SAIFireSafetyChecklistReformatted.pdf [https://perma.cc/43L4-MCV6] (2013 revised checklist). The
standard in force during the accident was SA8000 version 2008, which had been
replaced by version 2013.
168
Id.
169
Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
66-71 (1983) (discussing balancing of articulation and specification to create precise
optimal rules). In a blog post, SAI explicitly noted the need for “more clarity and
performance indicators in the requirements for fire safety for the SA8000 system,
e.g.: Required push bar/non-lockable exit doors for emergency evacuation [and]
[i]mplementation of fire drills during audits.” Fire Safety a Key Focus in SA8000
Revision, SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L (Mar. 11, 2013) (a copy is available from the
authors).
170
See SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, REPORT ADDENDUM, supra note 165, at 8
(discussing the oversight role of SAAS).
171
See SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, REPORT ADDENDUM, supra note 165, at 13-20
(finding potential fire hazards and lack of compliance at SA8000 certified factories).
172
SOC. ACCOUNTABILITY INT’L, REPORT ADDENDUM, supra note 165, at 23-24.
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(auditors). To complete this analysis, we develop an appropriate
negligence test for each of these functions fulfilled by PTRs.
An operable conceptualization of negligence by PTRs requires
some further analytical clarifications. The reason for this is that
PTRs are second-order tortfeasors, and their liability emerges only
in conjunction to that of a primary tortfeasor, such as the factory
owner in the Ali Enterprises case. Therefore, the standard method
of assessing negligence, based on the cost-benefit calculus of the
Learned Hand formula,173 cannot be used to assess their negligence
directly, without some recalibration. In a regular tort case, a
tortfeasor will be considered negligent if it failed to exercise costeffective precaution under the Learned Hand formula, or
precautions (B, for burden) lower than expected harms (PL, for
probability of loss).174 For example, if the factory failed to install fire
extinguishers in sufficient numbers, this would be considered
negligent if the cost of installing them (B) is lower than the expected
harm this measure could prevent (PL). However, for PTRs the
question of negligence is somewhat different, as they are not
investing to directly change the safety conditions in the factory. In
this sense, it is more difficult to define what B (the investment in
precautions) designates in the case of PTR liability.
First, consider the task of examining possible negligence in the
standard-setting stage, where the concern is that PTRs might set
standards that are too lax. In such cases, one way to evaluate the
negligence of the PTR would be to examine the investment required
to set a more accurate standard and consider it as an investment in
precautions (B). In many cases, setting appropriate standards
requires significant investment in research and the collection of data
in order to determine appropriate level of precautions. If the PTR
failed to efficiently invest in such research, we could say it was
negligent based on a modified Hand formula test. An alternative
way to determine negligence in the standard-setting stage would be
to piggyback on the efficiency of the resulting standard. That is, the
PTR will be considered negligent not if it failed to optimally invest
itself in the sense of the Hand formula test, but if it sets a standard
173

test).

See Landes & Posner, supra note 160, at 884 (describing the Hand formula

174
Landes & Posner, supra note 160, at 884; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85 (1987); Yotam Kaplan, Economic
Theory of Tort Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 270, 276
(Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky eds., 2020); Maytal Gilboa & Yotam
Kaplan, The Other Hand Formula, 26 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
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that fails to require the regulated firm to make cost-effective
investments in precautions. Finally, we note that when examining
the question of negligence in the rule-setting stage, a key element of
the inquiry concerns the appropriate combination of general
principles with more precise rules. 175 Thus, a key failing of the
regulatory framework in the Ali Enterprises case was that the
general standard governing health and safety in the SA8000
standard was not accompanied by more detailed and specific rules,
which would ensure appropriate implementation.
Second, consider the determination of negligence in the auditing
stage, or the enforcement stage of the private regulatory regime. For
the compliance function, the main question is whether the auditor
has invested optimal resources in verifying the enforcement of the
standard. Such investment may reflect the frequency of auditing
visits or the investment in the technical competence of its staff. Here
the test is whether the cost of the enforcement effort would be lower
than its utility in terms of reduction of expected harm. To illustrate,
in the Ali Enterprises case, it seems straightforward that the PTR
was negligent in the auditing stage. Thus, the cost of a more
rigorous auditing process that could have identified the various
safety flaws in the factory would have been justified by the expected
utility, represented by the chance of preventing the fire.176 Another
dimension of determining negligence here relates to the oversight
structure of the auditors. In a regulatory framework in which
compliance is delegated to manifold small auditors, dispersed
across multiple jurisdictions, there is obvious risk of sub-optimal
compliance. Indeed, in the Ali Enterprises case, this oversight risk
175
See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379 (1985)
(describing the familiar tension between “bright-line rules” and “flexible
standards”).
176
We abstract here from the causal question which is not trivial: one cannot
be sure that even if RINA would have issued a warning this would have changed
the situation in the factory. If causality is difficult to establish in specific cases,
partial compensation may be awarded. See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT
LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 70–73, 181–82, 193–95 (2001) (studying the possibility
of partial compensation to tort victims who were unable to fully prove causation);
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law”
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 857 (1984) (arguing that in appropriate
cases, courts can compensate victims based on the probability that their injuries
were caused by the defendant). See generally Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell:
Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881
(1982) (suggesting that courts can relax the requirement of causation in cases of
indeterminate causality); Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in
the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980) (offering a
concept of relative causation).
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was identified by SAI as one of the major weaknesses of the SA8000
regime. Therefore, the auditing process may be considered
negligent under a principle of res ipsa loquitur,177 if it is shown that
auditing was outsourced to agencies that are too far removed from
effective supervision mechanisms.
b. Liability of Standard-Setters in U.S. and Canadian Case Law
Generally speaking, tort doctrine recognizes the possibility of
holding private standard-setters liable in cases in which compliance
to the standard they set resulted in harm.178 For instance, courts in
the United States have recognized the liability of standard-setters
that set unsafe standards for pool construction. 179 In some cases,
swimmers were injured when swimming in pools that were built
according to approved safety standards, although it was later
determined that those standards themselves represented
insufficient precautions. In such cases, the victim’s injury can be
attributed to the negligence of the standard-setter, and courts
recognized the possibility of a duty of care between the standardsetter and end-users.180 In these cases, liability exists even though
the standard-setter had no legal duty to set the standard and did not
act directly as a state organ. Rather, once the standard-setter took it
upon itself to produce standards for the industry, it was responsible
to provide users with safe and suitable guidelines. 181 Similar
decisions also exist in the context of construction and building
codes.182
177
See William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L.
REV. 241, 241-42 (1936) (explaining the history and use of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, allowing the court to infer the defendant’s negligence indirectly in
appropriate cases).
178
See generally Paul Verbruggen, Tort Liability for Standards Development in the
United States and European Union, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL
STANDARDIZATION LAW: FURTHER INTERSECTIONS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 60
(Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2019) (addressing tort liability for suboptimal standards).
179
See, e.g., King v. Nat’l Spa & Pool Inst., Inc., 570 So. 2d 612, 615-16 (Ala.
1990) (holding that there was a legal duty to exercise care in setting standards).
180
See Meneely v. S.R. Smith, Inc., 5 P.3d 49, 57 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (finding
that the standard-setter owed a duty of care to the plaintiff).
181
See King, 570 So. 2d at 615-16.
182
See, e.g., Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Am. Plywood Ass’n, 1994 WL
463527, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (finding a duty owed to homeowners in setting
construction standards); Groppel Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 49-50 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981) (affirming the holding as to finding the manufacturer liable).
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Similar rulings exist also in the context of medical malpractice
where harms are sometimes caused indirectly by standard-setters.183
For instance, in Snyder v. Am. Ass’n of Blood Banks, 184 a patient
underwent an open-heart surgery and was accidently given HIVinfected blood. The standard-setter in this case was the American
Association of Blood Banks (AABB) that did not require appropriate
blood tests that might have prevented such occurrences. The court
in this case decided that the AABB was obligated to develop
improved standards and was therefore liable to some of the patient’s
harms. 185 Courts have also recognized the possibility of holding
trade unions liable in tort for standards they produce.186
In Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 187 an employee
was injured while helping to put out a fire in an apartment building
because a fire extinguisher had exploded unexpectedly. The court
held that the testing company was responsible for the resulting
harm for two reasons. First, the testing company approved the
design of the fire extinguisher despite the fact it was inherently
dangerous and highly likely to cause harm. Second, it affixed its
official label on the fire extinguisher, stating it had been inspected,
tested, and approved, while in fact it had not been.188 Magazines
and advertisers who gave their seal of approval to consumer
products can also be held liable when such products turn out to be
negligently made. 189 More generally, standard-setters were held
liable in a variety of contexts when their actions indirectly led to
harmful outcomes when industry players relied on their
standards.190
183
Cf. Case C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v. TÜV Rheinland LGA Prod. GmbH,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:128, ¶ 60 (Feb. 16, 2017) (stating that the standard-setter’s failure
to fulfill their obligations may give rise to liability).
184
Snyder v. Am. Ass’n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1036 (N.J. 1996).
185
Id. at 1049.
186
See Rountree v. Ching Feng Blinds Indus. Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 804, 805 (D.
Alaska 2008) (denying a motion for summary judgment after finding grounds for
imposing a duty on a trade union).
187
Hempstead v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109, 109 (D. Del.
1967).
188
Id. at 111.
189
See Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 680 (1969) (holding the
company that approved design of a faulty fire extinguisher liable).
190
See, e.g., Rottinghaus v. Howell, 666 P.2d 899, 899-900 (Wash. App. Div.3
1983) (agriculture); Case C-613/14, James Elliott Constr. Ltd. v. Irish Asphalt Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:821, ¶ 1 (Oct. 27, 2016) (construction); Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v.
Heller & Partners Ltd. [1963] AC 465, 465 (appeal taken from Eng.) (banking);
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The decision of the Ontario Court of Justice in Das v. George
Weston Limited 191 provides further support for our thesis. The
court’s ruling regarding the potential liability of the auditing
company Bureau Veritas emphasized that Bureau Veritas owed a
duty of care to the Bangladeshi employees of New Wave. The court
ruled that the auditing company was not liable because the risk of
Rana Plaza structural collapse was outside its contractual
responsibilities. The Court accepted here the argument made by
Bureau Veritas, which “acknowledged that if it had negligently
performed some service within the ambit of its social audit and a
New Wave Style employee was injured as a result, then Bureau
Veritas would be exposed to liability.”192
c. Network Implications and Policy Considerations
We argued that introducing tort liability in cases involving
private transnational regulation could yield positive policy results.
The option of using tort liability to regulate PTRs has been ignored
in the literature on transnational law and CSR, which focused almost
exclusively on the potential liability of MNEs.193 The key question
is whether the imposition of tort liability on PTRs would contribute
to a better global governance regime.
A possible concern, which was mentioned by the court in Das v.
George Weston Limited, is that imposing liability on MNEs based on
their decision to develop and promulgate ethical purchasing
practices (CSR standards) would deter businesses from developing
CSR policies in the first place.194 A similar concern applies also to
the case of PTRs: the risk of liability, which could be substantial,
might cause PTRs to exit the market, thus further weakening the
global regulatory structure that governs transnational value chain
interactions.
Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 605 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(financials); Banca Nazionale del Lavoro S.p.A. v. Playboy Club London Ltd. &
others [2018] UKSC 43, 43 (appeal taken from Eng.) (banking).
191
See Das, [2017] ONSC 4129, ¶ 5.
192
Id. ¶ 444.
193
For literatures focusing on the responsibility and potential liability of
MNEs, see sources cited supra note 48.
194
See Das, [2017] ONSC 4129, ¶ 456 (“[F]rom an exposure to liability
perspective, Loblaws would have been far better off if it had not developed and
promulgated its CSR standard.”).
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We emphasize, however, the opposite view. Namely, in order
to avoid liability, PTRs will not necessarily exist the market; they
will instead make sure to abide by the reasonableness standards of
tort law and invest efficiently in precautions and in the prevention
of harms. Importantly, the negligence regime aspires to free agents
from tort liability entirely, provided they exercised sufficient levels
of care.195 Therefore, our proposal does not necessitate any undue
burdens on PTRs, as long as they efficiently contribute to safety.
Thus, if PTRs are made to bear the damage caused to third parties
through their negligent standard-setting and compliance efforts,
they would be optimally incentivized to invest and efficiently
prevent harms.196 For instance, assume that a PTR needs to invest
$50,000 in precautions in order to develop and enforce optimal
standards designed to prevent factory fires. For simplicity, assume
further than the risk of a fire is ten percent and that the harm from a
fire equals one million dollars. Under a negligence regime, the
private regulator is faced with a simple choice: it can either invest
$50,000 in development and enforcement of the appropriate
standard or pay one million dollars in case an accident occurs (for
an expected cost of $100,000). The private regulator will prefer
investing $50,000 rather than face an expected cost of $100,000, and
the efficient outcome will be obtained. This is socially efficient, as
precautions here are cost-beneficial. More generally, if the PTR is
made to bear the full harm, it has full incentive to invest in
precautions when it is efficient to do so. Since the PTR fully
internalizes the harm, it now has every incentive to act to efficiently
minimize it.
Furthermore, we argue that introducing tort liability for PTRs
could support and facilitate the creation of a hybrid governance
model in which private transnational regulators, multinational
enterprises and global treaty organizations collaborate.197 We argue
that PTRs would be driven to explore various networking routes in
order to protect themselves from liability. These processes will,
195
See Landes & Posner, supra note 160, at 873 (“Under a negligence rule . . .
an injurer is liable for his victim's damages if and only if the accident resulted from
the injurer's failure to take due care.”).
196
See Landes & Posner, supra note 160, at 874-76 (showing how negligence
regime can incentivize PTRs to prevent harms).
197
For these emerging hybrid network structures, see Oren Perez & Ofir
Stegmann, Transnational Networked Constitutionalism, 45 J.L. & SOC’Y S135 (2018);
Oren Perez, Reuven Cohen & Nir Schreiber, Governance Through Global Networks and
Corporate Signaling, 13 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 447, 447-69 (2019).
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overall, tend to have a positive effect on the regulatory conditions
within developing countries. In particular, PTRs will seek to
connect their activity more explicitly with the operation of other
organizations and authorities in the transnational regulatory
universe, in order to accumulate legitimacy and lower their liability
exposure. This carries significant advantages and can potentially
generate positive feedback loops, strengthening the overall
structure of the transnational regulatory regime.
These types of processes can take several forms. First, to lower
their exposure to liability, PTRs will rely more strongly on the
provisions of international treaties. Such reliance can provide
standard-setters with immunity against claims attacking the
reasonableness of their standards. A good example are ILO
standards on Occupations Safety and Health.198 Additionally, PTRs
will seek to improve the standard-setting process by extending
collaboration with international organizations and local
stakeholders.
Extending collaboration with international
organizations such as UNEP or ILO will provide the standardsetting process with further expertise and also increase its political
and legal legitimacy.
Extending the involvement of local
stakeholders in the creation and revision of standards (particularly
from factories in developing countries) will contribute local
knowledge to the discussion and provide some counter force against
the potentially excessive influence from MNEs. Jointly, these
processes will turn the standard-setting process within PTRs into a
highly networked process and significantly improve its overall
contribution to safety, working conditions and environmental
standards.
Our proposal can have similar implications for the improvement
of compliance processes. Mainly, it will foster collaboration
between auditing firms, orchestrated by central certification
organizations such as SAAS and FLOCERT. Such consolidation will
be driven by several concurring processes. First, PTRs will be under
pressure to develop more efficient oversight mechanisms that can
govern their auditing services. This pressure can create pressure for
consolidation within the auditing domain, giving more prominence
to central certification organizations such as SAAS and FLOCERT,
which have the necessary resource and expertise to supervise a large
198
E.g., Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Promotional Framework for Occupational
Safety and Health Convention, 2006 (No. 187), (June 15, 2006); ILO, Occupational
Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155), (June 22, 1981); ILO, Occupational
Health Services Convention, 1985 (No. 161), (June 26, 1985).

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

716

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 43:3

and nationally dispersed group of small auditors. Second, the risk
of liability will drive auditing firms to purchase liability insurance.
Insurers will most likely require some form of oversight as a precondition for providing insurance or may charge high premiums for
independent auditors. Third, MNEs will prefer to engage with
auditors that are subject to oversight by credible central
organizations and carry their own insurance.
PTRs have therefore a variety of reasonable steps they can take
in response to the risk of liability, steps that will significantly
improve transnational regulatory regimes. We therefore do not
think that our proposal will lead to over-deterrence, and will not
make the operation of PTRs prohibitively costly, or push them out
of the market. Additionally, from a broader theoretical perspective,
we think that the claim that PTRs will be driven out of the market
should be taken with a grain of salt. If we assume PTRs have a real
contribution to safety and to appropriate work conditions, this
contribution should be reflected in court’s negligence determination
and reduce PTRs’ exposure to tort liability. To the extent that PTRs
will be driven out of the market when faced with the risk of tort
liability, this would simply indicate that those entities did not make
a true contribution to safety or to compliance. Weeding out
incompetent PTRs should therefore be considered a positive
outcome of our proposal.
As noted above, our proposal is consistent with existing trends
driven by global organizations such as the ILO and UNEP. Such
organizations, recognizing the limitations of their own compliance
powers, have sought to forge partnerships with non-state
organizations, including civic organizations, corporations, and
PTRs. Thus, for example, Article 6(4)(b) of the Paris Agreement
establishes a mechanism that seeks to incentivize and facilitate
participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by
public and private entities.199 The increasing role played by private
entities in climate action is also reflected in the Non-State Actor Zone
for Climate Action portal200 where non-state actors, such as regions,
cities, companies, investors and other organizations, can display
their commitments to act on climate change. As of February 12,
2021, there were 149 cooperative initiatives registered on the portal
199
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference
of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Addendum, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Annex, at 25 (Jan. 29, 2016).
200
GLOB. CLIMATE ACTION PORTAL, https://climateaction.unfccc.int/
[https://perma.cc/4XVB-NYWE] (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
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with 20,417 participants. Similarly, the ILO has invested significant
effort in developing public–private partnerships (PPPs), largely
focusing on implementation.201 The response of the ILO to the 2013
Rana Plaza factory disaster provides a good illustration of this
approach. The ILO is involved in the governance of the resulting
Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, which is an
independent, legally binding agreement between brands and trade
unions to work towards a safe and healthy garment and textile
industry in Bangladesh.202
d. Jurisdiction
A major advantage of our proposal is that it will allow workers
and other interest holders to sue for their rights in courts located in
developed countries, thereby avoiding the myriad problems
associated with the need to pursue their claims in courts in
developing countries. As we explain above, workers who suffered
a harm will find it difficult to secure legal recourse in their own
jurisdiction, due to a variety of legal, economic, and political
reasons.203 At the same time, workers will find it difficult to sue
“down the supply chain” and hold buyers or parent companies in
developed countries responsible for their harms.204
Our proposal extends the opportunities open for victims, thus
resolving some of the jurisdictional problems associated with
lawsuits against MNEs. PTRs are multinational agents, and often
have a legal presence in developed countries. 205 This means that
workers will typically be able to sue PTRs in developed countries
based on the standard rules of international jurisdiction, 206 which
Jakovleski et al., supra note 70, at 82-108.
An ILO representative serves as the Independent Chair of the Steering
Committee for the Accord. 2018 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh:
May
2018,
Art.
1,
https://bangladesh.wpengine.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/11/2018-Accord.pdf [https://perma.cc/994B-XPH4]. For
more details on the Accord, see ACCORD, http://bangladeshaccord.org/
[https://perma.cc/9SFY-TBBJ] (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
203
See discussion supra Part II.B.
204
See discussion supra Part II.B.ii.
205
For instance, Social Accountability International (SAI), the institution
responsible for SA8000, is based in New York. Rasche, supra note 45.
206
See Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
145, 170-71 n.5 (1973) (noting that only a brief presence or business is required for
jurisdiction).
201
202
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dictates that in all legal systems, the location of the defendant is
sufficient to establish international jurisdiction in civil cases. 207
Furthermore, the rules of forum non conveniens will probably not
apply in such claims208 because there is no doubt that the tortious
behavior has happened within the jurisdictional boundaries of the
developed country (where the private regulator resides).209
V.

CONCLUSION

One of the features of the globalized economy is the mismatch
between the regulatory needs of the global society and the capacity
of the global legal system to provide solutions. This reflects, first,
the persisting fragmentation of private law and regulatory law
(which runs counter to the expansion of cross-border
manufacturing, consumption, and trade) and, second, the
limitations of the global treaty system (whose dependence on
governmental consensus undermines its capacity to provide policy
solutions). This mismatch creates numerous regulatory gaps,
ranging from unsatisfactory treatment of workers in southern
regions to a wide-ranging failure to cope with global risks such as
climate change. While theoretically these dilemmas could have been
dealt with by public international law (through either reinforced
public law treaties or harmonization of local private and regulatory
law), the difficulties of reaching government consensus make this
path unfeasible. The rise of private transnational institutions that
produce and enforce diverse regulatory standards represents an
evolutionary response to this regulatory gap. Such institutions
operate as private regulators, setting quasi-legal framework for
market participants. These bodies seek to fill lacunae in the laws of
developing countries (e.g., in labor or environmental law) or in
global treaty law (e.g., climate change). Yet, since these bodies act
outside the traditional framework of the sovereign state, the legal
status and impact of the private regulatory frameworks they create
remains unclear.
Commonly, this debate has been carried out under public law
lens. In this Article, we explore this problem from a private law
perspective. We explore the possibility of using traditional private
207
208
209
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law doctrines, and tort law doctrines in particular, as a means of
solving the meta-regulatory problem of regulating the emergent
universe of private global regulators. More specifically, we examine
the implications of holding transnational private regulators liable in
tort, when their actions—as norm-makers and compliance agents—
lead (directly or indirectly) to undesirable or harmful outcomes.
This proposal aims to offer a meta-regulatory framework: first, by
providing transnational standard-setting bodies with sufficient
incentives to set optimal standards, and second, by assuring that
auditing agencies have sufficient incentive to verify these standards
are implemented. As we explain above, our approach is likely to
strengthen already existing processes of collaboration between PTRs
and International Treaty Organizations.
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